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PATHOLOGIES AT THE INTERSECTION OF
THE BUDGET AND TAX LEGISLATIVE
PROCESSES
CHERYL D. BLOCK*
Abstract: Recently, Congress utilized a new gimmick in its budget
legislative process. Under "pay as you go" (PAYGO) budget rules,
Congress had used the repeal of installment sale reporting for certain
taxpayers to "pay for" revenue-losing provisions in its budget deal with
the administration; the following year, however, Congress "repealed the
repeal" of the installment sale provision, enabling new spending and tax
cuts not included in the earlier budget deal and not paid for with
appropriate offsets. Although such gimmicks are not UlICOI11111011, the
installment sale episode reflected pathologies engrained at the
intersection of the current federal budget and tax legislative processes.
This Article examines those pathologies, their origins, and their effects
on federal tax and budget policy. The Article then reviews the
installment sale episode as a breach of Congress's contract with itself,
emblematic of the pathologies and the harm they cause to genuine
policy considerations. As Congress considers the future of its budget
offset rules, this Article also suggests reforms that would re-emphasize
the democracy-oriented goals of the budget legislative process.
INTRODUCTION
Gimmicks are an unfortunate reality of a modern federal budget
legislative process that offers participants opportunities to play games
with numbers. Whenever a new legislative program is considered,
lawmakers must assess its budgetary impact. To do so, they must adopt
certain economic assumptions. As an initial matter, lawmakers look at
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baseline projections—the amount of revenue "that would be raised or
spent without new legislation."' Next, legislators calculate a score—"the
amounts by which the legislation would change projected future
revenue or spending."2 Because the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the
Joint Committee on Taxation ( JCT) all prepare official sets of num-
bers on budgetary impact, participants in the process have at least
three sets of numbers to work (or play) with.5 According to budget
expert Allen Schick, "The assumptions are where political opportun-
ism and manipulation thrive." He adds, "When an interest group
lobbies Congress for a tax cut or spending increase, it no longer
suffices that the proposal be palatable to members of Congress; it is
also necessary that the proposal get a favorable score. Quite a few
former budget or appropriations committees' staff members now pro-
vide expert advice on how to structure legislative proposals to
influence the score. "5
Other gimmicks include timing and accounting tricks. For exam-
ple, proponents may suggest a delay in the imposition of costs im-
posed by new legislation to future years outside the budget window so
that the costs are technically outside the time frame requiring an off-
setting increase in revenue.6 With regard to accounting, Congress uses
1 ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 56 (rev. ed. 2000)
(emphasis added).
z Id.
The OMB prepares the President's budget, complete with its analysis of revenue im-
pact and revenue projections. Given its mistrust of economic budget information prepared
by OMB for the President, Congress initially established the CBO to provide Congress with
its own set of budgetary figures. "The CBO was set up to provide a congressional counter-
part to the OMB and the President's economic staff, the Council of Economic Advisors
(CEA).... The CBO was to provide a bastion of neutral analysis, loyal to the institution of
Congress, rather than to committees or to parties." AARON WILDAVSKY & NAOMI CAIDEN,
THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 78 (4th ed. 2001). The C130 provides
information and assistance to the Budget and Appropriations Committees of the House
and Senate and otherwise assists the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Commit-
tees. 2 U.S.C. § 602(a), (b) (2000). Among its other duties, the JCT is to "investigate the
operation and effects of the Federal system of the internal revenue taxes." 26 U.S.C.
§ 8022(1)(A) (2000). The JCT provides revenue estimates of considered or enacted tax
legislation to the CBO. 2 U.S.C. § 601(f) (2000). Professor Michael Graetz laments the tax
policy considerations lost when legislators play games with numbers from these three dif-
ferent entities. See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
609,614-18 (1995).
4 SCHICK, supra note 1, at 54.
5 Id. at 61-62.
6 See, e.g., id. at 68 ("The easiest way to remove a spending increase from the score is to
schedule it to take effect beyond the period covered by the baseline."); Elizabeth Garrett,
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cash-flow, rather than present value accounting. This permits Con-
gress not to take future costs into account until they are actually paid-
out, as opposed to assessing the present value of anticipated future
costs.? Finally, proponents may get around the congressional budget
rules altogether by convincing the executive branch to adopt new
spending programs through agency regulations. 8
Regrettably, the by-product of this budget gamesmanship is a
dramatic reduction in genuine tax policy consideration. Because
much major tax legislation is now routinely included in omnibus
budget legislation, 9 the tax and budget legislative processes are in-
creasingly linked. In 1995, Professor Michael Graetz lamented that
"[t] he political focus on balancing traditional tax policymaking con-
cerns for improving equity and economic efficiency has been subor-
dinated in recent legislation to reflect the overriding goal of insuring
specific annual revenue effects of proposed tax policy changes over
the 'budget period."18 If anything, the problem has worsened since
1995. Lawmakers are more driven to get the budget numbers to
"come out right" than they are to satisfy any traditional tax policy ob-
jectives of horizontal or vertical equity, efficiency, economic efficiency,
or simplicity.
Not long ago, the participants in the budget and tax legislative
processes played a new and different game. Unlike the gimmicks with
numbers just described, the players this time followed all the techni-
cal rules. When the budget numbers didn't work out the way Con-
gress wanted them to, Congress simply changed them. Through bla-
tant manipulation of formal rules, the players effectively unraveled
part of an omnibus budget deal altogether after the fact. Both budget
and tax policy suffered as a result.
In this recent episode, Congress first enacted an amendment to
the Internal Revenue Code that disallowed installment sale reporting
Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. Cm.
L. REV. 501,527 (1998) ("delaying revenue loss until the 'out-years' is not an uncommon
strategy for advocates of new programs").
7 See Garrett, supra note 6, at 529-30.
8 This is a process that Professor Garrett refers to as "downstreaming." Id. at 530-36.
9 GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 52-
57 (2001) (documenting the increasing use of omnibus packaging from 1949 through
1994); BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN
THE U.S. CONGRESS 70 (2d ed. 2000) rile contemporary Congress now often legislates
through enormous omnibus bills, something it rarely did in the past.").
10 Graetz, supra note 3, at 612.
866	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 43:863
to certain accrual method taxpayers." This repeal of installment re-
porting for accrual method taxpayers was projected to increase fed-
eral revenues over a ten-year period from 1999 through 2010 by over
$2 billion.' 2 In turn, this revenue increase was explicitly used under
"pay as you go" (PAYGO) budget rules to "pay for" numerous exten-
sions of expired and expiring tax provisions.13
 Under PAYGO rules,
any new legislation calling for increases in direct spending or tax cuts
must be paid for by new legislation with offsetting decreases in direct
spending or tax increases."
Almost before the ink was dry on the President's signature enact-
ing the new installment sale provision into law, Congressman Bill
Archer, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee intro-
duced legislation to override it. 15 Congress voted to repeal the new
provision retroactively, instructing that the Internal Revenue Code
should be applied and administered as if the installment provision
had never been enacted in the first place.16 Under PAYGO rules, the
retroactive repeal of the installment sale provision lost federal reve-
nue and, absent an offsetting revenue increase, should have triggered
a mandatory sequester of government funds. No problem. Congress
simply directed the OMB, responsible for the sequester, to change the
sequester balance to zero. 17 When the dust settled, Congress had
agreed to use the repeal of installment reporting for accrual method
taxpayers to pay for the cost of other tax cuts, but when the invoice
arrived to pay for the tax cuts, Congress never paid the bill.
Although the Nielsen ratings surely would not have jumped, this
legislative move might well have been incorporated into an episode of
the old "Twilight Zone" television series. To be sure, the provision in-
11
 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170,
§ 536, 113 Stat. 1860, 1936 (adding a new § 453(a) (2) to the Internal Revenue Code,
which disallowed installment reporting for most accrual basis taxpayers).
12 JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 106TH CONGRESS, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLA-
TION (JCS-2-01) app. 184 (Apr. 19, 2001).
13
 Thus, the repeal of installment reporting for accrual method taxpayers was included
in Subtitle C, specifically entitled, "Revenue Offsets," of the Tax Relief and Extension Act
of 1999, which, in turn, was included in the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improve-
ment Act. See 113 Stat. 1860, tit. V, subtit. C.
14
 A discussion of the PAYGO rules and their relationship with other budgetary offset
rules follows at infra notes 91-116 and accompanying text.
15
 H.R. 3594, 106th Cong. (2000).
16 Installment Tax Correction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-573, § 2(b), 2000
U.S.C.CA.N. (114 Stat.) 3061 (instructing that the Internal Revenue Code "shall be ap-
plied and administered as if [§ 453(a) (2)] . had not been enacted").
17
 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 2(b), 2000
U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat.) 2763,2763-64.
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volved was relatively minor and, therefore, received little public atten-
tion. Nevertheless, the legislative process resulted in a new law. Con-
gress and the administration had agreed to a budget deal, which in-
cluded new spending and accompanying offsets to pay for the
spending. Part of the budget deal was that this installment change
would be used under the budget rules as an offset to pay for other
provisions iii the bill scored as revenue losers. Early in the year follow-
ing the overall budget "deal," Congress repealed the installment sale
provision as a stand-alone measure. Moreover, the President went
along and signed the stand-alone repeal measure. The Internal Reve-
nue Service and the public were told to pretend that it never hap-
pened. In the end, proponents of the new spending and tax cuts got
their pet programs through without paying for them with an appro-
priate offset."
This recent episode leaves one wondering just what went wrong.
Literature regarding interest group influence suggests that lobbying
efforts to block legislation in the first place are more likely to succeed
than efforts to repeal legislation already enacted." If the tax conse-
quences were so adverse to taxpayers, where were the small interest
group lobbies during initial consideration of the controversial provi-
sion and why didn't they block its passage? Were the interest groups
simply asleep at the wheel? Why did President Clinton sign the bill,
retroactively repealing the provision he had so recently signed into
law?
In fairness to the affected interest groups, Congress, and the
President, short provisions contained in a long and complex piece of
tax legislation might easily slip through the cracks unnoticed. Moreo-
ver, Congress sometimes does make honest mistakes. It is not unusual
for Congress to enact technical corrections legislation shortly after
enacting complex tax legislation. On the other hand, one of the ma-
jor functions of interest groups in the tax legislative process is to pore
over proposed legislation and to uncover provisions, however small,
that would adversely affect interest group members.
The recent episode offers important lessons regarding the proc-
ess through which Congress works out differences in statutory lan-
guage that emerge from the House and the Senate at conference. In
addition, it offers valuable lessons about the legislative budget proc-
18 For a detailed discussion of the installment sale repeal story, see infra notes 117-163
and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., KAY LE1IMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 314-15 (1986).
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ess. It should come as no surprise that politicians will manipulate pro-
cedural and other rules in order to achieve desired results. At the
same time, the results achieved in the recent installment sale method
episode, at least, made a mockery of legislative budget process reve-
nue offset requirements. 20
One explanation for the recent installment sale episode may be
that the strict legislative rules regarding the budget process were
adopted in response to periods of dramatic federal deficits. The rules
were designed to impose systematic fiscal restraints upon a Congress
that otherwise seemed unable to control itself, believing that it could
continue to lower taxes and to increase spending without significant
economic consequence. Some have suggested that such fiscal con-
straints are not as important in periods of budget surplus. The in-
stallment sale episode occurred during a surplus period in which
Congress might not have felt as compelled as it otherwise would to
live by its strict budget rules. If strict offsets are necessary in times of
budget deficits, but not in times of budget surplus, perhaps some fine-
tuning of the rules is necessary to take these differences into account.
As of this writing, the statutory PAYGO rules have "sunset," or
expired, as applied to new legislation enacted for fiscal year 2003 and
thereafter.2 I The Senate recently agreed to a temporary renewal of
PAYGO rules until April, 2003, and several other bills have been in-
troduced that provide for longer extensions and strengthening of
PAYGO rules. 22 The President's budget documents for fiscal year 2003
indicate a willingness to continue to work within the confines of
2° See SINCLAIR, supra note 9, at 77-79; see also Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional
Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 100 CoLum. L. REV. 702, 724-29 (2000)
(describing changes in the budget and tax legislative processes that tend to alter the bal-
ance of power in favor of political party leaders).
21 For sequestration purposes, however, the PAYGO rules continue to apply through
2006. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET ISSUES: BUDGET ENFORCEMENT COMPLI-
ANCE REPORT, GAO-02-794, at 11 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 GAO BUDGET REPORT] ("Al-
though BEA expires in 2002, the sequestration procedure applies through 2006 to elimi-
nate any projected net costs stemming from PAYGO legislation enacted through fiscal year
2002.").
22 S. Res. 304, § 2(b), 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted) (extending Senate PAYGO point-
of-order rule to April 15, 2003); S. 2791, 107th Cong. § '2 (2002) (would extend statutory
PAYGO rules through 2011, with exceptions for on-budget surplus years), id. § 3(d) (would
extend Senate PAYGO point of order); Budget Enforcement Act of 2002, S. 2465, 107th
Cong. § 3 (would extend PAYGO through 2007, with exception that there be no sequestra-
tion for fiscal years in which a surplus exists); Budget Fraud Elimination Act of 2002, H.R.
5259, 107th Cong. §§ 261, 271 (would extend PAYGO through 2007 and include provisions
to reduce sequester amounts to the extent of budget surplus); Assuring Honesty and Ac-
countability Act of 2002, H.R. 4593, 107th Cong. § 3 (would extend PAYGO indefinitely).
20021
	
Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Processes 	 869
PAYGO.23 In the meantime, Congress has been unable to pass a con-
current budget resolution for 2003. 24
In the installment sale episode, Congress bypassed PAYGO se-
quester requirements simply by directing the OMB to set mandatory
sequester amounts to zero. This is a congressional process sometimes
referred to as "directed storekeeping." One purpose of this Article is
to use the recent installment sale reporting episode to expose devices,
including directed storekeeping, which I consider pathologies at the
intersections of the current rules for the budget and tax legislative
processes. Budget and tax matters are among the most important po-
litical choices that legislators make on behalf of the voting and taxpay-
ing public. In a democratic government, it is important for such deci-
sions to be transparent and open and for legislators to be fully
accountable. Although there was nothing illegal or technically im-
proper about the process used in the installment sale episode, much
of it consisted of deals worked out behind closed doors. The process
was far from open and transparent. Indeed, it took me weeks wearing
the hat of an investigative reporter simply to reconstruct the events
that transpired. Quite simply, this is not the way to make budget and
tax laws. The process is badly flawed in many ways. As Congress re-
thinks the budget offset rules in general and PAYGO in particular, this
is an especially appropriate time to consider reforms.
Part I of this Article provides a brief background on the applica-
ble budget and budget offset rules.25 Part II describes the manipula-
tion of the process involved in the recent installment sale reporting
amendments.26 Part III seeks to identify the process pathologies that
23 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRES., BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2003: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 284 (2002) [hereinafter 2003
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES] (President's budget concedes in advance that his administra-
tion would support "PAYGO requirements that would carry out the 2003 budget's propos-
als for mandatory spending and receipts.").
24 The House has passed its own budget resolution for fiscal year 2003 and is moving
forward under its own guidelines. H.R. Con. Res. 353, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted). The
Senate Budget Committee adopted its own budget resolution, S. Con. Res. 100, 107th
Cong. (2002), but the resolution never made it to the floor. The Senate is moving directly
to appropriations without a resolution. Although the failure to adopt a concurrent budget
resolution is highly unusual and contrary to statutory budget requirements, see infra note
50, this would not be the first time Congress proceeded without a budget. As budget ob-
server Allen Schick described, "In 1998, for the first time since Congress established its
own budget process a quarter of a century earlier, it failed to adopt the annual resolution.
But this failure did not stop other legislative actions related to the budget." Scuttot, supra
note 1, at 106.
5 See infra notes 28-116.
26 See infra notes 117-163.
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led to the problem and to suggest some reforms related to the PAYGO
process. 27
I. BUDGET RULES
A. Tax Legislation and the Budget
In general, the legal academy in the taxation area tends to focus
more on the substance of tax laws than on the legislative process that
created them. Perhaps the explanation lies in a fundamental fear of
stomach distress.28 More likely, however, the tax academy simply has
not regarded the tax legislative process as sufficiently distinct from the
legislative process more generally to warrant close inspection. That
said, a number of legal scholars have focused on the tax legislative
process. Some scholars have used a public choice analysis to explore
the role of interest groups in the development of tax legislation."
Others have focused on doctrines of statutory interpretation, many of
which look back to the legislative process underlying the statute at
issue, particularly as applied to tax legislation. 30 Remarkably few, how-
27
 See infra notes 164-268. The entire budget process, particularly the scoring method-
ology, has been the subject of intense scrutiny in recent years. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, BUDGET ISSUES: BUDGET ENFORCEMENT COMPLIANCE REPORT, GAO-01-777
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 GAO BUDGET REPORT'. For a good overview on the current
need for reforms, see Issues in Budget Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Budget,
107th Cong. (May 2, 2002) (statement of William G. Gale, Brookings Institute). Larger
budget reform issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Article, which generally is
limited to the discussion of PAYGO and related budget offset procedures used in connec-
tion with enacttnent of new tax legislation.
29 The classic old quip attributed to Otto von Bismark was that "legislation is like sau-
sage: it's better not to watch it being made." More recently, Professor Eustice added, It has
been said that there are three events one should never observe close up: the making of
sausages, fudgsicles, and tax legislation." James E. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practi-
tioner, 45 TAx L. REV. 7, 14 (1989) (emphasis added). My children would surely beg to
differ with regard to the fudgsicles.
29 See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, Or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 547-54 (1994) ("Legislative Process Theory"); Julie A. Roin,
United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice Theory and the Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 62 (1988); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legisla-
tive Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (ispo) ; Edward A.
Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expendi-
tures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE LJ. 1165 (1993).
s° See, e.g., Caron, supra note 29, at 539-47 ("Statutory Construction Theory"); John F.
Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax Code, 71 Tut.. L. REv. 1501
(1997); Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning the Tax Code and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 771 (1997); Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, Purposivism,' and the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes, 51 TAx L. REv. 677 (1996); Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the
Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991); Dan-
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ever, have written about the intersections between the budget and tax
legislative processes." This is somewhat surprising given the increas-
ing dominance of the budget process in determining the outcome of
major tax initiatives.
The President now routinely uses the State of the Union address
each January and his presentation of the executive budget to Con-
gress each February to showcase major tax initiatives. Although tax
legislation can still be enacted in the course of normal legislative af-
fairs, most major tax legislation now appears in response to the Presi-
dent's budget as part of an omnibus budget reconciliation package.
As a consequence, tax bills must comply with reconciliation proce-
dures. Moreover, even if the budget resolution does not contain rec-
onciliation instructions, through fiscal year 2002, tax legislation was
required to comply with PAYGO offset procedures included within
statutory budget rules. Some version of these rules is almost certain to
be extended into the future." In this budget world, lobbyists advocat-
ing tax benefits for their clients can no longer simply argue the merits
of their particular programs. They must be prepared to look at all of
the proposed revenue raisers and losers. They must fend off compet-
ing predators seeking the same scarce revenue resources allocated to
the tax-writing committees and/or find weak groups with existing
benefits that can be eliminated.
The Internal Revenue Code has a reputation for being exces-
sively complex. Virtually all major calls for tax reform pursue the elu-
sive goal of simplicity. As a relative newcomer to the legislative budget
process, it strikes me that the budget rules are even more complex
than the Tax Code. As one budget observer noted, "Congress has . . .
created a massive piece of legislation which is understood by almost
no one, and which can be interpreted and manipulated by the major-
ity to its political advantage."" In the course of my research, I have
found precious little that provides an accessible explanation of the
iel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning:• Statutory Inimpretation in Federal Tax
Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325 (2001).
31 The most dramatic exception is Elizabeth Garrett. See Garrett, supra note 6, at 502-
04; Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process,
35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998); see also Graetz, supra note 3; Mary L. Heen, Reinventing
Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program Oversight Under the Government Performance and
Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751 (2000).
32 For enacted and pending legislation as of the publication of this article, see supra
note 22.
83 Donald B. Tobin, Less is Mare: A Move Toward Sanity in the Budget Process, 16 Sr. LOUIS
U. Pun. L. REV. 115, 117 (1996).
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interplay among the component parts of the rules for the tax and
budget legislative processes. One of the goals for this Article is simply
to provide an accessible explanation of the basic budget rules as they
apply to tax legislation. Having struggled in my own research to sort
out the differences among the use of the reconciliation process, in-
ternal point-of-order rules, and the statutory PAYGO rules, I believe I
can provide a service by offering a basic account of the interplay of
these rules. I hope to do so by focusing on the major aspects of the
provisions without getting lost in the minutia. Moreover, without such
an initial account, it will be difficult to meet my larger objectives of
describing what is wrong with the process, and how it might be im-
proved. The sections that immediately follow discuss the congres-
sional budget rules, with a particular focus on those relevant to tax
legislation.
B. Dueling Budgets
The complex modern budget process, which began with the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 (CBA),34 repre-
sents one of an increasing number of new and innovative procedures
for enacting major legislation. 35
 The first step in the congressional
budget process is for the President to submit a budget for the next
fiscal year to Congress on or before the first Monday in February.36 In
a sense, this executive budget operates simply as the first move in a
complex chess match with Congress. Congress need not adopt the
President's recommendations. Nevertheless, the President's budget
serves as an important starting point for negotiations and ultimate
congressional action on the budget. 37 The President's budget fre-
quently includes proposals for major tax initiatives, either to cut or to
34
 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 602-692
(2000)).
35
 For example, Congress increasingly has come to rely on combining numerous
pieces of legislation together as part of an "omnibus" package. KAUTZ, supra note 9, at 52-
57 (documenting the increasing use of omnibus packaging from 1949 through 1994).
Legislative deals are more frequently hammered out through "summits" involving high-
level negotiations between high-ranking executive branch officials and congressional lead-
ers. SINCLAIR, supra note 9, at 77-79; Garrett, supra note 20, at 724-29. Political scientist
Barbara Sinclair describes these as developments of "unorthodox lawmaking," and argues
that the old traditional textbook diagram of the legislative process describes fewer and
fewer pieces of major legislation. SINCLAIR, supra note 9, at 4; see also id. at 70-81 (ch. 5,
"Omnibus Legislation, the Budget Process, and Summits").
§ 300, 88 Stat. at 306 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 631) (timetable with respect to the con-
gressional budget process for any fiscal year).
97 See SCHICK, supra note 1, at 74-104 (ch. 5, "The President's Budget").
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increase taxes. For example, shortly after taking office in 1981, Presi-
dent Reagan managed to push through a major set of tax and spend-
ing cuts." President Reagan's budget for fiscal year 1982 called for
further major tax and spending cuts." President Clinton's fiscal year
1994 budget, on the other hand, called for major tax increases to re-
duce the deficito Tax legislative proposals in the President's budget
generally are quite specific and detailed. As one budget expert ob-
served, however, "[o]nce Congress becomes involved, it usually exer-
cises considerable independence, altering the volume or composition
of taxes to suit its preferences. Even when it meets the President's
revenue target, Congress does so in its own manner."41
Prior to 1974, Congress did not formally prepare a budget of its
own, but simply responded to proposals set forth in the presidential
budget. In its first major budget act, the CBA,42 Congress established
its current House and Senate budget committees along with the
CB0.43 The CBO was to serve as a neutral counterpoint to the execu-
tive branch's OMB. 44 "The major purposes of this Act were to reassert
38 The Economic Recovery Tax Act, of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172,
176-85 (phased-in an approximately twenty-three percent reduction in individual tax rates
over four years).
39 1n this budget message, President Reagan boasted,
Our package includes a proposal to reduce substantially the personal income
tax rates levied on our people and to accelerate the recovery of business with
capital investment. These rate reductions are essential to restoring strength
and growth to the economy by reducing the existing tax barriers that dis-
courage work, saving, and investment.
Message to the Congress Transmitting Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions (Mar. 10, 1981), 1981
PUB. PAPERS OF RONALD REAGAN 222. Congress didn't go along, however, and actually cut
back some of the earlier tax and spending cuts. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
40 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRES., BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 5, 12 (1994).
41 SCHICK, supra note 1, at 140.
42 Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 602-692 (2000)).
45 Although the CBO provides Congress with general budget numbers and baselines,
the JCT has its own staff of revenue estimators who provide information to the tax-writing
committees on the revenue and distributional effects of proposed tax legislation. 2 U.S.C.
§ 601(1) (2000). The CBO is directed to use the JCT. revenue estimates provided by the
JCT for any revenue legislation considered or enacted by Congress.
44 See WILDAVSKY & CAIDEN, supra note 3, at 78; see also Philip G. Joyce & Robert 1).
Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29 1IARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 429, 432 (1992) (The C110 was Intended to be a source of non-partisan analysis
and information relating to the budget and the economy. Indeed, perhaps the most im-
portant early role for the CBO was providing alternative economic forecasts to Con-
gress.").
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the congressional role into budgeting, to add some centralizing
influence to the federal budget process, and to constrain the use of
impoundments."45 The Act provided timetables for budgetary action
and, most important, established procedures for Congress to generate
a budget of its own. The budget timetables call for both chambers of
Congress to complete action on a concurrent budget resolution by
April I 5th,46 although the deadline is virtually never met.47
 The con-
current budget resolution is not law and does not provide specific de-
tails regarding how money is to be raised or spent. Rather, the budget
resolution serves as a fiscal blueprint or framework within which Con-
gress makes its substantive decisions on revenue and spending. "As a
blueprint, the status of the budget resolution varies from year to year.
In some years it strongly influences budgetary decisions; in others it
has very little impact."45
The modern federal budget process is essentially broken into two
large budget "packages."49 One deals with discretionary spending
programs, which require annual appropriations. The other deals with
permanent direct or mandatory spending programs. Tax legislation
and entitlements fall within the latter category. Once tax laws are en-
acted, they remain in place until Congress chooses to amend or re-
peal them. Another increasingly common technique in tax legislation
is to build in sunset provisions, under which a substantive tax law will
expire at a specified date unless it is reenacted." Taxation, then, is a
fundamental part of the direct or mandatory budget process. Because
45 Joyce & Reischauer, supra note 44, at 431-32. In part, the Act was a direct response
to President Nixon's impoundments of billions of congressionally-appropriated funds. For
a discussion of the Nixon impoundments in 1972 and 1973, see ALLEN SCHICK, CONGRESS
AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING AND TAXING 45-49 (1980); see also WILDAVSKY &
CAIDEN, supra note 3, at 75-77.
46 2 U.S.C. § 631.
47
 For explanations as to why budget resolutions are rarely on schedule, see SCHICK,
Si/pia note 1, at 123-25.
SCHICK, supra note 1, at 32-33.
49 Naomi Caiden, The New Rules of the Federal Budget Game, 44 Pun. ADMIN. Rm.,. 109,
112-14 (Mar.-Apr. 1984); see also Garrett, supra note 31, at 388-89 (discussing the possible
advantages of changing from our current bifurcated budget "packaging" to a budget that
would use a more systematic functional approach, dividing the budget into packages based
upon missions or objectives of the federal government).
50
 For example, I.R.C. § 127 grants a limited exclusion for certain educational assis-
tance programs provided by an employer. The exclusion was set to expire as of December
31,2001. I.R.C. § 127(d) (2000). Congress recently eliminated the sunset provision, how-
ever, making the education assistance exclusion permanent. Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 200I, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 411,2001 U.S.C.CA.N. (115 Stat.)
38,63.
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tax legislation falls under the direct spending part of the budget, the
discussion that follows will focus primarily on that portion of the
budget, rather than on discretionary spending or annual appropria-
tions.
Statutory rules call for a concurrent budget resolution setting
appropriate revenue and spending levels for the next fiscal year and
at least four ensuing fiscal years. 51 Historically, budget resolutions have
covered five-year periods. More recently, however, Congress has exer-
cised its authority to adopt a longer, usually ten-year, budget. 52 The
congressional budget resolution itself first includes aggregate total
revenues and spending and the amounts by which the totals should be
changed. In major deficit years, for example, the budget resolution
might call for a particular increase in revenues over a period of ten
years." In surplus years, the resolution might call for decreased reve-
nues. The budget resolution also includes aggregate total new budget
authority and outlays. 54
Another required part of the congressional budget is a "tax ex-
penditure" analysis. Professor Stanley Surrey was the first to identify
the concept of a "tax expenditure." He observed that the federal tax
system really consisted of two parts, the first of which was the basic
structure necessary to implement the individual and corporate in-
come tax.55 The second part of the tax system was actually a series of
government expenditures "grafted on to the structure of the income
tax proper."56 The tax expenditure concept recognizes that any tax
deduction or credit really is a cost to the federal government. When
the government provides these tax breaks, it effectively "spends" fed-
eral money. This spending should be taken into account in the
budget process. Put slightly differently, the tax expenditure idea is
51 2 U.S.C. § 632(a) (2000).
52 See, e.g., Concurrent. Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2000, H.R. Con. Res.
68, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted). The report accompanying the 2000 budget noted that
"[bludget resolutions have traditionally included 5-year allocations . 	 This budget reso-
lution provides for 10-year allocations 	 The flexibility to provide 10-year allocations is
found in section 302 of the Budget Act ...." H.R. REP. No. 106-73, at 73 (1999).
55 The increases in revenue are measured from an economic baseline established by
the CBO.
m "Budget authority" is "the permission granted to an agency or department to make
commitments to spend money ... [whereas] outlays ... are the actual dollars that either
have been or will be spent on a particular activity." STANLEY E. COLLENDER, THE GUIDE TO
THE FEDERAL BUDGET FISCAL. 2000, at 2 (1999).
55 STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDI-
TURES 6 (1973).
56 Id.
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that "certain provisions of the tax laws are not really tax provisions,
but are actually government spending programs disguised in tax lan-
guage."57 Although the concept itself is not especially controversial,
arriving at a mutually acceptable definition of what constitutes a tax
expenditure has proven quite intractable. Congress now recognizes
the tax expenditure concept to the point of requiring that estimated
levels of tax expenditures be reported in the congressional budget
resolution.58 Perhaps as a result of the disagreements over the proper
definition of a "tax expenditure," however, the statute says nothing
further about the role that the tax expenditure budget should play.
For the moment, some suggest that the list is largely useful to "fund-
ing predators" looking for offsets to pay for new tax breaks. If a lobby-
ing group can convince Congress to repeal or cut back someone else's
tax expenditure, they can make room for their own pet provision. 58
In addition to stating aggregate spending, the budget allocates
total budget authority and outlays among twenty functional categories
with respect to both discretionary and direct spending.° A joint ex-
planatory statement accompanying the conference report on the
budget resolution is required to allocate spending totals to congres-
sional appropriations committees. 61 The appropriations committees
then suballocate amounts within their subcommittees with authoriz-
ing or spending jurisdiction. 62 Because most of the allocated budget
authority with regard to direct or mandatory spending goes to fund
existing programs, entitlements, and tax breaks, most direct spending
will occur without any further legislative action from authorizing
committees.° To the extent that the budget resolution calls for in-
creases or decreases in direct spending, the authorizing committees
will report new legislation recommending changes to existing pro-
grams, entitlements, or tax laws. The budget resolution provides no
57
 Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L J . 1155,1155.
58 2 U.S.C. § 632(e) (2) (F,) (2000).
59 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 6, at 517. Later in her article, Garrett suggests that this
may not necessarily be a bad thing. She says that careful analysis of existing tax expendi-
tures by lobbyists, albeit for self-serving reasons, may provide more information and may
serve to institutionalize tax expenditure analysis in ways that Congress otherwise could not.
Id. at 561-66.
6° 2 U.S.C. § 632.
61
 This is commonly known in the budget world as the "section 302 allocation" process,
referring to § 632 of the CBA. See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
§ 302(a), 88 Stat. 297,308 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 633(a)).
62 This is usually done through a "section 302(b) report," as provided in the CBA.
§ 302(b), 88 Stat. at 308-09 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 633(6)).
63 See, e.g., H .R. REP. NO. 105-555, at 54 (1998).
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details regarding how revenues are to be raised or how the new
budget authority or outlays are to be spent.
C. Budget Reconciliation
1. Reconciliation Instructions
Once Congress has decided on its overall objectives in the budget
resolution, the reconciliation process is designed to provide an en-
forcement mechanism and impose some self-discipline to assure that
committees responsible for the various pieces of the overall plan fol-
low through by developing substantive legislation that comports with
the plan. Under the CBA, Congress may, but is not required to include
reconciliation instructions with the concurrent budget resolution. 64
Although the budget reconciliation rules were included in the origi-
nal GBA in 1974, they have only come to be used with frequency in
more recent years. 65 If the budget resolution simply calls for continu-
ing revenues and spending programs at the same levels as in the prior
fiscal year, no changes in substantive legislation and, therefore, no
reconciliation instructions are necessary. Reconciliation instructions
generally are used only when the budget resolution calls for changes in
existing revenue or spending laws. As one budget expert noted:
The extent to which the budget resolution seeks change
can be measured by the scope of its reconciliation instruc-
tions. A resolution that does not contain reconciliation
merely accommodates the status quo; one that has such in-
structions seeks to change existing law. The broader the
scope of reconciliation—the more committees subjected to
it and the more dollars involved—the greater the impor-
tance of the resolution in setting Congress's agenda and re-
vising budget policy. 66
Reconciliation instructions give deadlines by which specific
committees are directed to come up with proposed legislative changes
64 § 301(b), 88 Stat. at 306-07 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 633(b) (2000)).
65 See Garrett, supra note 20, at 718 ("Surprisingly, the framers of the 1974 Act did not
foresee the rise of reconciliation acts; only in the early 1980s did party leaders and other
congressional actors realize the importance of this legislative vehicle.").
66 SCIIMIE, supra note 1, at 108; see also COLLENDER, supra note 54, at 56 ("It [reconcilia-
tion] is used only if Congress wants to make changes in mandatory spending and revenues.
But because such changes are not required each year, it is up to Congress to decide
whether it wants to proceed.").
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that accomplish objectives provided for in the budget resolution. Fail-
ing such deadlines, the budget committees themselves are authorized
to draft legislation that complies with reconciliation instructions. Not
surprisingly, authorizing committees almost never fail to meet the
deadlines. Because revenue laws virtually always are involved in the
budget process, the House Ways and Means Committee and the Sen-
ate Finance Committee likewise are virtually always subject to recon-
ciliation instructions. These two committees will sometimes be the
only committees involved in the reconciliation process. For example,
the concurrent budget resolution for fiscal year 2000 directed the Re-
publican-controlled Senate Finance Committee to report a reconcilia-
tion bill proposing legislative changes necessary to reduce revenues by
$765 billion for the period of fiscal years 2000 through 2009. 67 The
Republican-controlled House Ways and Means Committee was subject
to similar directives.68 Thus, the committees were given the happy task
of spending federal dollars, something lawmakers love to do. On the
other hand, the lawmakers were not given a free ride. Unfortunately,
other budget offset rules required them to find spending cuts or tax
increases to pay for their compliance with the happy reconciliation
instructions.
Whether they are directed to one or to multiple committees, rec-
onciliation instructions provide no specific instructions as to how the
budget objectives are to be achieved. Committees simply are in-
structed that their proposed legislative changes must increase or de-
crease revenues by specified amounts. Thus, committees are free to
make trade-offs among programs within their jurisdictions to meet
their reconciliation obligations. Although budget offset rules offer
more latitude, the tax-writing committees generally have operated
under a "rule requiring that every reduction in tax be offset by a
matching revenue raiser in the same
Once the authorizing committees have drafted substantive legis-
lation pursuant to reconciliation instructions, they then submit the
legislation to the budget committees. House and Senate budget
57 Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2000, H.R. Con. Res. 68, 106th
Cong. § 104 (1999) (enacted).
68 Id. § 105. By contrast, the prior year's budget resolution included reconciliation in-
structions to nine different authorizing committees to submit to the Budget Committee
changes in law necessary to achieve the specified levels of direct spending and/or reve-
nue." H.R. REP. No. 105-555, at 61 (1998).
69 Sheldon D. Pollack, PAYGO and the Politics of the Surplus, 82 TAX NOTES 1035, 1049
(1999) (emphasis added).
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committees are responsible for compiling the legislation submitted by
all committees that were subject to the instructions into a reconcilia-
tion bill. The budget committees, however, are not permitted to make
any substantive changes in the legislation reported from the authoriz-
ing committees. The respective budget committees in the House and
Senate will then report the reconciliation bills to the House and Sen-
ate floors for consideration. These bills are referred to simply as rec-
onciliation bills, or sometimes as "omnibus" reconciliation bills. The
term 'omnibus" can be somewhat arbitrary and lacks a precise
definition." One widely used definition is simply "[1] egislation that
addresses numerous and not necessarily related subjects, issues, and
programs, and therefore is usually highly complex and long ...
Budget reconciliation bills are among the most common omnibus
packages."
2. Procedural Rules
a. Points of Order
The instincts of the American public and lawmakers in Congress
are always to want more spending for particular programs without in-
creasing taxes to pay for them. The concurrent budget resolution sets
macrobudgetary objectives, but it is not law and is not binding. Given
the natural inclination of lawmakers to want to provide programs to
constituents, it might be easy for legislators to ignore their previous
decisions on macrobudgetary objectives when the time comes to con-
sider microbudgetary considerations on individual programs. Con-
gress attempts to keep itself honest through a complex series of pro-
cedurl points of order.
For example, once Congress has completed action on a concur-
rent budget resolution, it is not in order to consider any legislation
that would cause total or aggregate budget authority or outlays to ex-
ceed amounts provided for in the budget resolution or for revenues
70 See, e.g., KRuTz, supra note 9, at 45 ("1.11e term omnibus can be used arbitrarily. At the
introduction stage of the process, members of Congress may call a bill whatever they
choose. Members may simply label a bill 'omnibus' to make it sound more important.").
71 SINCLAIR, supra note 9, at 71.
72 Id. Krutz attempts a more systematic definition, including an element of scope and
size. He defines an omnibus bill as one that "(1) spans three or more major topic policy
areas or 10 or more subtopic policy areas and (2) is greater than the mean plus one stan-
dard deviation of major bills in words." See Klemm, supra note 9, at 46.
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to be less than that called for in the resolution." Any legislation that
would cause a particular committee to exceed amounts allocated to it
under the budget resolution is similarly subject to a point of order."
With respect to reconciliation legislation in particular, statutory
budget rules provide that any amendment that would increase outlays
or decrease revenues is out of order unless the amendment simultane-
ously includes offsetting provisions that would cause the amendment
overall to be revenue neutral."
Constraints imposed by the budget resolution, reconciliation in-
structions, and the point-of-order enforcement rules can severely limit
committee flexibility. For example, proposed legislation to increase
revenues above the aggregate amount permitted in the budget resolu-
tion would be subject to a point of order even if it was designed to off-
set increases in direct spending and was, thereby, revenue neutral in
its overall effect. To avoid these problems, budget resolutions often
include specific provisions for reserve funds. Creation of a reserve fund
generally grants authority to the Budget Committee Chair to change a
legislative committee's budget allocation under specified conditions."
For example, the congressional budget resolution for fiscal year 2000
included a reserve fund permitting the Budget Committee Chair to
reduce spending and revenue aggregates and revise committee alloca-
tions for legislation that reduced revenues as long as the legislation
would not increase the deficit or decrease the surplus."
75 2 U.S.C. § 641(d) (1) (House of Representatives), (2) (Senate) (2000).
74 Id. § 633(f) (1) (House of Representatives) , (2) (Senate).
75 Id. § 641(d) (1) (House of Representatives), (2) (Senate).
76
 SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS: AN EXPLA-
NATION, S. REP. No. 105-67, at 13, 57 (1998). In the past, reserve funds have been used
primarily in the Senate. Somewhat similar flexibility is provided in the House through
statutory exceptions to certain points of order. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 633(g) (1). In its most
recent budget resolution, however, the House also used the reserve fund technique. See
H.R. Con. Res. 353, 107th Cong., tit. II, Reserve and Contingency Funds (2002). Because
the House and Senate did not agree on a concurrent budget resolution for FY 2003, this
resolution serves as the budget only for purposes of the House of Representatives.
77
 H.R. Con. Res. 68, 106th Cong. § 202 (1999) (enacted) (Tax Reduction Reserve
Fund in the Senate). Other examples of reserve funds tie changes in Budget Committee
authority to changes in budget and economic outlook. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 83, 107th
Cong. § 214 (2001) (Reserve Fund for Additional Tax Cuts and Debt Reduction). Still
other reserve funds are tied to the passage of specific legislation. See id. § 211 (Reserve
Fund for Medicare) ("If the Committee on Finance of the Senate or the Committee on
Ways and Means of the I-louse of Representatives ... reports on a bill ... which reforms
the Medicare program ... and improves the access of beneficiaries under that program to
prescription drugs, the appropriate chairman ... may revise committee allocations ....").
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b. Point-of-Omer Waives
Despite the bite of the numerous budget point-of-order rules,
their potency is diminished to the extent that the rules can be waived.
In the House, a budget point of order can be waived by simple major-
ity vote. In addition, the House may consider budget legislation under
a rule from the Rules Committee that waives budget points of order.
In other words, the House may decide in advance that it will debate
the budget legislation under a procedural rule that disallows budget
points of order. 78 Such House rules must pass by simple majority
vote." Point-of-order enforcement rules prove to be far more cum-
bersome in the Senate, where most can only be waived by a three-
fifths vote or sixty members of the Senate. 8° This supermajority re-
quirement for waiving Senate points of order obviously makes it
harder for the Senate to unravel the budget deal worked out through
the budget reconciliation process.
c. Special Procedural Rules in the Senate
Reconciliation bills in the Senate are privileged in numerous
other ways also designed to ease and speed up passage of the budget.
Unlike other legislation in the Senate, which is subject to unlimited
debate and, therefore, the threat of potential filibuster, both budget
resolutions and budget reconciliation bills in the Senate are subject to
statutory time limits. Debate on the concurrent budget resolution is
limited to no more than fifty hours81 and debate on reconciliation
bills is limited to twenty hours. 82
Statutory budget rules also alter another unique feature of the
Senate. In the normal course of legislative affairs, senators are free to
offer nongermane amendments to any pending legislation. Unique to
the Senate, this nongermaneness privilege is used to strategic advan-
tage, particularly by minority members who would otherwise have
78 For a general discussion of special Rules Committee rules that preemptively waive
points of order, See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY
PROCESS 126-27 (5th ed. 2001).
79
	
JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 106-
320, House Rule XXVII, el. 1 (2001) (providing that the voice of the majority decides as to
general matters, compare with § 509); see also OLESZEK, SUM note 78.
80 }taus V. SATURNO, POINTS OF ORDER IN THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, No. 97-865 GOV (Apr. 15, 1999).
21 2 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (2000).
82 Id. § 641(e) (2).
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difficulty getting their legislation to the floor. For example, any indi-
vidual senator can introduce a huge piece of major legislation as a
nongermane amendment to a completely unrelated bill. Special pro-
cedural rules applicable in the Senate with regard to the concurrent
budget resolutions and reconciliation bills, however, provide that
o amendment that is not germane to the provisions . . . shall be
received. "85
A somewhat related procedural rule applies during Senate floor
consideration of reconciliation bills. Known as the "Byrd Rule," after
Senator Byrd who first proposed it, the rule creates a point of order
challenging material "extraneous" to the reconciliation instructions.
As budget observer Allen Schick observed,
Because there is a strong possibility that a reconciliation bill
will pass once it is initiated, it is an attractive vehicle for pro-
visions that are unrelated to the budget. In response to this
problem, the Senate adopted the "Byrd Rule," which restricts
the inclusion of extraneous matter in a reconciliation bill."
The meaning of "extraneous" can be complex, ambiguous, and often
depends on controversial rulings from the Chair. Included among the
definitions of extraneous is any amendment or provision that would
increase the deficit without an offsetting provision in the same title. 85
As with the other Senate points or order, the Byrd Rule can be waived
only by a three-fifths vote.
D. Additional Fiscal Constraints
1. Background
The original budget rules of the CBA were process rules that were
outcome-neutral. Over time, the reconciliation process came to be
used to force Congress to stick to the macrobudgetary decisions made
83 Id. § 636(b) (2) (as applied to concurrent budget resolutions); id. § 641(e) (1) (as
applied to reconciliation bills).
M SCHICK, supra note 1, at 128; see also Tobin, supra note 33, at 132 ("Some Senators
recognized the potential for abuse of the reconciliation process and were concerned that
individuals would attempt to use the reconciliation process as a way to circumvent the
filibuster requirement in the Senate.... In order to stop the abuse of the reconciliation
process, the Senate passed the 'Byrd Rule,' which was designed to stop the Senate front
considering extraneous matters on the reconciliation bill.") (footnotes omitted).
83 2 U.S.C. § 644(b) (1); see SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET PROCESS: AN EXPLANATION, S. REP. No. 105-67, at 22 (1998).
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in the budget resolution. Still, as budget deficits grew, Congress found
these rules to be inadequate. The shift from process-oriented rules to
more outcome-oriented rules began with the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Control Act of 1985, commonly known as Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings (fiGRH"). 86 GRH included strict targets for reduc-
ing the deficit. Automatic procedures for meeting the targets were
declared unconstitutional 87 and Congress responded by amending the
statute to ensure its constitutionality.88 If Congress failed to meet
deficit targets, GRH triggered across-the-board sequestrations, dra-
matically reducing congressional discretion and threatening severe
impact on major government programs. As Wildaysky and Caiden
noted about GRH, "Here we have a procedure that almost every
member of Congress believed was foolish, if not stupid; that everyone
who knew anything about it thought could be improved upon in five
minutes; yet it received majority support in both Houses and was
signed by the President."89 Not surprisingly, GRH was a failure. In
1990, Congress shifted from dreams of balancing the budget to the
more manageable self-imposed expenditure controls. Again, Wildav-
sky and Caiden colorfully described the shift:
The journey from GRH to the Budget Enforcement Act
(BEA) evokes the grand themes of budgeting in our time—
ideological dissensus so deep the opposing sides make min-
ute measurements of outcomes, a deficit octopus so entan-
gling that its grip can be loosened but not cut through, and
a temporary truce based on the common desire of politi-
cians to create a process that will not automatically stigma-
tize them as failures. Thus they moved from budget balance,
which they could not achieve, to expenditure control, which
they had a fighting chance to attain."
86 Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, Part C, 99 Stat. 1037, 1063-93 (1985).
87 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
88 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754. For a comprehensive discussion of developments leading to
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and a discussion of its provisions and impact, see Kate Stith,
Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. Rev. 595
(1988).
89 WILDAVSKY & CAIDEN, supra note 3, at 127.
8° Id. at 133-34.
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2. PAYGO Requirements
a. introduction
PAYGO fiscal constraints built into the budget process were
originally designed to control federal spending and reduce federal
deficits. The rules apply broadly to revenue and entitlement laws,91
seeking to ensure that new legislation will, on net, be deficit neutral.92
PAYGO rules do not require reexamination of past policy decisions.
The PAYGO rules require that new tax legislation be "revenue
neutral." In other words, new tax or entitlement legislation cannot
increase costs to the government. Although the 1990 Budget En-
forcement Act first codified and mandated the "neutrality" principle,
this was not the first time that Congress operated under such a prin-
ciple. In fact, the landmark Tax Reform Act of 1986 was developed
around the principle that the legislation would be both revenue neu-
tral and distributionally neutral. In other words, the 1986 Act was de-
signed to raise no more revenue than it cost, but was also designed so
that the burden or incidence of taxation remained neutral with re-
gard to taxpayers at different income levels. Codification of the
PAYGO rules in 1990 was an indication that Congress did not trust
itself to comply with the "revenue neutrality" principles voluntarily
established in earlier years. The PAYGO rules included apparently
harsh sequestration devices to force Congress to do the right thing. 93
Although the Joint Committee on Taxation regularly provides distri-
bution tables to tax-writing committees concerning the distributional
impact of proposed legislation, the PAYGO rules apply only to revenue
91 Because the tax-writing committees also have jurisdiction over several entitlement
programs, such as Medicare, they could technically raid those entitlement programs to pay
for tax cuts under PAYGO rules. Nevertheless, the tax-writing committees generally have
operated under a rule whereby every tax reduction must be matched with an equivalent
revenue raiser within the same bill. SHELDON D. POI LACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POL-
ICY: REVENUE AND Potmcs 188 (1996) ('The PAYGO rule for annual offsets of revenue
was translated by Chairman Rostenkowski and Bensten into a practice within both tax
committees whereby any legislative proposal that costs revenue must be coupled with an
offsetting revenue raiser in the same MIL This procedure is still followed in the 104th Con-
gress, even though both Rostenkowski and Bensten are no longer members."). The proce-
dure apparently continues to the present.
92 BILL HENIFF, JR., PAY-AS-YOU-GO RULES IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS, Congres-
sional Research Service Report, RS20006, at I (Mar. 5, 2001); Garrett, supra note 6, at 510.
93 Although sequestration sounds rather harsh, the sting is diminished through nu-
merous exemptions. Social Security is exempt from PAYGO sequestration. In addition, 2
U.S.C. § 905 includes an extensive list of other programs also exempt from mandatory
sequestration. 2 U.S.C. § 905 (2000).
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neutrality and do not also demand that legislation be distributionally
neutral.
b. Internal Senate Rule: PAYGO Point of Order
Although the emphasis of most discussion on PAYGO rules is on
the statutory requirements adopted by the 1990 Budget Enforcement
Act, the Senate also has internal PAYGO mechanisms. Since 1994, the
Senate has imposed internal PAYGO requirements on itself through
point-of-order rules incorporated into yearly budget resolutions."
The internal PAYGO point-of-order rule in the Senate can only be
waived by a three-fifths vote."
c. Statutory PAYGO Rules
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 imposed statutory spend-
ing caps with regard to discretionary spending, and statutory PAYGO
budget offset rules applicable to tax legislation and other direct
spending legislation." Unlike the reconciliation rules and the Sen-
ate's internal PAYGO procedure, which are merely internal rules en-
forceable only through procedural points of order, the statutory
PAYGO rules are enforceable through mandatory sequestration provi-
sions.97 The OMB maintains a PAYGO "scorecard," keeping track of
the cumulative effect of all new legislation subject to PAYGO require-
" See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 68, 106th Cong. § 207 (1999) (enacted) (Pay-As-You-Go
Point of Order in the Senate). The Senate PAYGO point-of-order rules sunset in 2002
along with the statutory PAYGO rules, id. § 207(g), but they have been temporarily ex-
tended until April 15, 2003. S. Res. 304, § 2 (b) , 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).
95 See SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS: AN Ex-
PLANATION, S. REP. No. 105-67, at 19 (1998). Unless otherwise indicated, references in
this Article to "PAYGO" are to the statutory rules leading to sequestration, rather than to
the Senate internal point of order rules.
'16 Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat. 1388-573 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 902 (2000)).
97 PAYGO enforcement provisions are codified in 2 U.S.C. § 902(b). The OMB is re-
quired to calculate any net increase to the deficit caused by direct spending and revenue
bills at the close of each legislative session. Within fifteen days after the close of the ses-
sion, the President is required to issue a sequestration order reducing non-exempt spend-
ing by a uniform percentage in order to eliminate the net deficit increase. Although the
sequestration rules sound harsh, "[m]ost direct spending is either exempt from a seques-
tration order or operates under special rules that minimize the reduction that can be
made in direct spending. Social Security is exempt from pay-as-you-go sequester and Medi-
care cannot be reduced by more than 4 percent." SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS: AN EXPLANATION, S. REP. No. 105-67, at 57 (1998).
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ments. If the result at the end of a congressional session is a net cost,
OMB must sequester nonexempt direct spending to offset the cost."
The PAYGO rules initially applied only through fiscal year 1995,
but were extended through fiscal year 1998 by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993." PAYGO was again extended through
fiscal year 2002 by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997. 1°° Prior to
the terrorist tragedies of September 11, 2001, it appeared that the
previously unthought of federal budget surpluses would continue.
During that period, some Republicans were calling for repeal of
PAYGO rules. 1°1 As of this writing, the United States is again facing
deficits as Congress considers whether to extend PAYGO. An exten-
sion of PAYGO rules in some form now appears likely. 102 Even admini-
stration officials have publicly announced that President Bush would
accept an extension of PAYGO requirements. 1 °3
President Bush's preference, as expressed in the Fiscal Year 2003
Budget, would be to substitute the existing concurrent budget resolu-
tion with a joint budget resolution that would have the force of law
and would set overall levels for discretionary spending, mandatory
spending, receipts, and debt. 104 Congress is unlikely, however, to yield
budgetary authority to the President to such a dramatic extent. After
" 2002 GAO BUDGET REPORT, supra note 21, at 11. As the 2002 GAO Report notes,
"felffective on its enactment, [the 1997 PAYGO extension, see infra note 100], set the
scorecard balance to zero for the then-current year and for each subsequent year through
fiscal year 2002. This prevented any net savings achieved by legislation enacted prior to
enactment of [the 1997 PAYGO extension] from being used to offset deficit-increasing
legislation enacted through 2002." Id. The CBO also provides a PAYGO "scorecard" and
there are often disparities in the way specific pieces of legislation are scored by CBO and
OMB for PAYGO purposes. See, for example, the discussion of scoring differences for
2001-02 legislation. Id. at 14-31. In the event of discrepancies, however, OMB figures are
controlling for purposes of sequestration orders. 2 U.S.C. § 902(b) .
" Pub. L. No. 103-66, tit. XIV, 107 Stat. 312,683-85.
100 Pub. L. No. 105-33, tit. X, 111 Stat. 251,677-712. Because Congress is now consid-
ering the budget for fiscal year 2003, the PAYGO rules are not applicable unless Congress
chooses to extend them as part of its current budget activity. The Senate has extended its
PAYGO point-of-order rule until April 15,2003. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
101 For example, Rep. Kasich proposed a repeal of PAYGO. See discussion in Pollack,
supra note 69, at 1040-41.
102 See enacted and proposed legislation, supra note 22.
103 Biennial Budgeting: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Rules, 106th Cong. ( Jul. 25,
2001) (statement of Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director of OMB) ("the President ... supports
... the extension of ... the PAYGO requirement"). In other testimony the OMB Director
made clear, however, the administration's position that the rules "should be modernized in
order to guide budget decisions in an era of surplus." Proposed Budget Process Revisions: Hear-
ing Before the House Budget Comm., 106th Cong. ( June 27, 2001) (statement of Mitchell E.
Daniels, Jr., Director of OMB) [hereinafter Federal Budget Process Hearings].
1°4 2003 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 283.
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all, the very point of the first major budget act in 1974 was for Con-
gress to assert its independence in a budget process that had been
disproportionately controlled by the executive branch. 105 In fact, Al-
len Schick went so far as to describe the 1966-1973 period of difficult
congressional-presidential relations leading up to the CBA in 1974 as
the "Seven Year Budget War" and the CBA itself as the "Congres-
sional Budget Treaty of 1974."107 Given this history, congressional ap-
proval of a joint budget agreement with the force of law would be
surprising.
As an alternative, the President's budget concedes in advance
that his administration would support "PAYGO requirements that
would carry out the 2003 budget's proposals for mandatory spending
and receipts." Testimony on budget policy uniformly seems to sup-
port an extension of PAYGO-type fiscal disciplines. 109 Even Republican
members of Congress have testified in favor of maintaining the
PAYGO rules.no
d. Operation of PAYGO in Times of Surplus
The technical language of the PAYGO statute states that "it] he
purpose of this section is to assure that any legislation . . . affecting
direct spending or receipts that increases the deficit in any fiscal year
covered by this Act will trigger an offsetting sequestration. NH Given
that the statutory language makes no specific reference to surplus,
debate has ensued over whether PAYGO rules apply in budget surplus
105 For a description of the period of presidential dominance that led to the CBA in
1974, see Setucx, supra note 1, at 14-18.
1 °0 Solicit, supra note 45, at 17. For a brief discussion of the Nixon impoundments in
1972 and 1973, see id. at 45-49.
1 °7 Id. at 51.
1" 2003 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 284. Budget documents also
notified Congress that "I tihe Administration will work with the Congress during the next
session to develop budget enforcement mechanisms, including ... a PAYGO requirement
for entitlement spending and tax legislation that are consistent with the needs of the coun-
try." Id. at, 283.
109 Federal Budget Process Structure: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Budget, 100th
Cong. (July 19, 2001) (statement of Barry B. Anderson, Deputy Dir. of the CBO) therein-
after Federal Budget Process Structure Hearing].
no Id. (statement of Rep. Bill Frenzel) ("PAYGO discipline should be maintained....
Legislation that would commit surpluses in excess of the amounts contained in the budget
should be subject to PAYGO rules and, if enacted, trigger sequestration.").
111 2 U.S.C. § 902(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
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years.'" Most commentators believe that the PAYGO rules do apply to
surplus years as well as deficit ye ars. 113
When Congress began to work with its first surpluses under
PAYGO in the late 1990s, then-OMB Director Jacob Lew announced
the OMB position that "PAYGO does apply when there is an on-
budget surplus."'" As noted by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
in its recent report on budget enforcement, Congress should clarify
the issue of PAYGO's application to surplus years in the event that
PAYGO is extended.' 15
 Whether or not PAYGO should apply to budget
surplus years is a normative question, which will be considered further
in the final section of this Article. 116
IL THE TAX LEGISLATION THAT WASN'T: A CASE STUDY IN
PATHOLOGICAL TAX LEGISLATION THROUGH THE
BUDGET PROCESS
A. Introduction
Along with many other things, the modern presidential budget
generally includes an extensive package of revenue proposals, some of
which raise and others which lose revenue. The Treasury Department
often publishes a voluminous document to accompany the budget.
With respect to each proposed change, the Treasury Department de-
scribes current tax provisions, explains the reasons for changing
them, and describes the President's tax legislation proposal. 117 In a
112 HR. REP. No. 106-73, at 87 (1999) ('The law is somewhat unclear whether PAYGO
lapses when there is an on-budget surplus."); see also 2002 GAO BUDGET REPORT, supra
note 21, at 43 ("During the nation's few years of surpluses, questions were raised about
whether the prohibition on increasing the deficit also applied to reducing the surplus.").
115 See, e.g., COLLENDER, supra note 54, at 38 n.14 ('There is some controversy about
whether PAYGO continues if there is a surplus. A literal reading of the statutory language
seems to indicate that it can only be used if there is a deficit. However, the Congressional
Budget Office and House and Senate Budget Committees have all stated that they will
continue to apply PAYGO if the deficit would be increased or surplus reduced."); HENIFF,
supra note 92, at 1 ("Even with a budget surplus, the PAYGO process is applicable.");
Scntett, supra note 1, at 153-54 ("PAYGO does not distinguish between a surplus and a
deficit; in both situations revenue losses must be offset.").
114
 Letter from OMB Director Jacob Lew to Honorable john Sprat, ranking minority
member of the House Budget Committee (Apr. 6, 1999), cited in ROBERT KEITH, PAY-AS-
You-Go REQUIREMENT FOR FY 2002: A PROCEDURAL ASSESSMENT, CRS Report for Con-
gress, No. RL 31194 (Nov. 23, 2001).
115 2002 GAO BUDGET REPORT, supra note 21, at 43.
Ito See infra notes 247-253 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., DEP'T OF TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVE-
NUE PROPOSALS (Feb. 1999).
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similar vein, one should start with a basic understanding of the state
of existing law before the events began in order to understand the
budget game that was played out in connection with the recent in-
stallment sale provision episode. The section that follows offers a very
brief description of the state of the law before the first coin toss.
B. The Law Prior to FY 2000 Budget Tinkering—Installment Method
Reporting for Accrual Method Taxpayers
When a taxpayer engages in a sale or exchange of property, the
Internal Revenue Code118 requires that the entire gain or loss be re-
ported, unless otherwise provided in Subtitle A. 119 Absent a special
exception, a taxpayer who sells property in exchange for an install-
ment or promissory note would be required to report the full gain in
the taxable year of the sale, computed as the full face value of the
note minus the adjusted basis in the property sold. 12° The installment
sale provisions of § 453 recognize the potential hardship imposed
upon installment sellers who would otherwise be required to report
the entire gain from a sale of property even though receipt of some or
all of the proceeds from the sale was delayed. Installment reporting
under § 453 permits these sellers to include a portion of the taxable
gain as each payment is received, thus spreading the taxable gain over
the life of the note. 121
Installment reporting seems eminently sensible for cash method
taxpayers, who generally report their income when it is 'actually or
constructively received." 22 In fact, some may wonder why a special
provision permitting installment reporting was necessary for cash
methqd taxpayers in the first place. After all, if cash method taxpayers
report income when it is actually received, one might think the cash
method taxpayer should be taxed as payments are received. Under our
tax system, however, income is defined as an economic benefit or an
accession to wealth. 123 The economic benefit or accession to wealth
118 Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Internal Revenue Code are to the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986, codified at I.R.C. §§ 1-9833 (2000).
"9 I.R.C. § 1001(c). Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code refers to I.R.C. §§ 1—
1563, which govern federal income taxes.
10 Id. § 1001(a).
121 Under this method, "the income recognized for any taxable year ... is that propor-
tion of the payments received in that year which the gross profit (realized or to be realized
when payment is completed) bears to the total contract price." Id. § 453(c).
122 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1) (i) (as amended in 2001).
125 The Internal Revenue Code defines gross income as "all income from whatever
source derived." I.R.C. § 61(a). The courts have clarified the definition of income some-
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from an installment sale is not the receipt of payments on the note.
Rather, receipt of the installment note itself is the economic benefit,
triggering a full recognition of gain or loss. Thus, absent the special
anti-hardship rules in § 453, a cash method taxpayer would be re-
quired to report the full gain from the sale upon receipt of the note.
Consider now the taxpayer who uses an accrual method of ac-
counting. This includes most business taxpayers. In fact, many busi-
ness taxpayers effectively are required to use the accrual method of ac-
counting by § 448, which disallows use of the cash method to C
corporations and partnerships that have a C corporation as a partner,
among others.'" Under the accrual method of accounting, "income is
to be included for the taxable year when all events have occurred that
fix the right to receive the income and the amount of the income can
be determined with reasonable accuracy." 125 Under this definition,
the accrual method effectively is an accelerated method of accounting.
Instead of reporting income when it is received, as a cash method tax-
payer would, the accrual method taxpayer reports income in the year
in which the taxpayer becomes entitled to receive it. Unlike cash
method taxpayers, accrual method taxpayers routinely report income
in advance, even though their actual receipt of income is delayed.
The use of installment reporting upon a sale of property arguably
is inconsistent with the accrual method, which requires taxpayers to
report income when they are entitled to receive it, regardless of when
they actually receive it. The buyer's signature on an installment con-
tract, along with the buyer's delivery of a promissory or installment
note, presumably is the event that fixes the seller's right to be paid
under the accrual method. 126 Nevertheless, accrual method taxpayers
had been using the installment method without interference, until
Congress enacted the § 453(a) (2) in 1999.
what more usefully. See, e.g., Comm's' v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)
("undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion"); United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1950) ("pres-
ent economic benefit").
124 I.R.C. § 448(a) (2000). Certain exceptions are provided for farming businesses,
qualified personal service corporations, and entities with gross receipts of not more than
$5 million. Id. § 448(b).
125 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1) (ii) (as amended in 2001).
12° See, e.g., Cash n Accrual Methods of Accounting: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small
Business, 106th Cong. (Apr. 5, 2000) (statement of Joseph Mikrut, Treasury Tax Legislative
Counsel) [hereinafter Mikrut testimony' ("The installment method is inconsistent with an
accrual method of accounting, which generally requires a taxpayer to pay tax on a realized
gain, regardless of whether the taxpayer has received the related cash.").
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C. 1999 Amendments to the Installment Method Rules for
Accrual Method Taxpayers
President Clinton's budget proposals for fiscal year 2000 in-
cluded a proposal to disallow installment reporting for accrual
method taxpayers. 127 In support of his position, the President argued
that "[tjhe installment method is inconsistent with an accrual method
of accounting and effectively allows an accrual method taxpayer to
recognize income from certain property using the cash receipts and
disbursements method. Consequently, the method fails to reflect the
economic results of a taxpayer's business during the taxable year. "128
Treasury Department testimony before the Senate Finance Commit-
tee further portrayed the installment sale provision as one among sev-
eral proposed "measures that are principally designed to improve
measurement of income by eliminating methods of accounting that
result in a mismeasurement of economic income or provide disparate
treatment among similarly situated taxpayers." This description
portrays the measure as a correction or loophole closer. As a correct
interpretation of tax policy and tax accounting principles, accrual
method taxpayers theoretically should not have been reporting in-
stallment payments under the installment method in the first place.
Thus, the administration simply was advocating reparation of a flawed
Tax Code provision. 130 It also happens that the administration pro-
jected that the repeal or "correction" would increase federal reve-
nue."1
127 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRES., BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2000: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 77 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter 2000 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES]; see also DEP'T OF TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF
THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS 146 (Feb. 1999). In addition, the President's
budget included proposed changes to pledging rules, which require the holder of an in-
stallment note to recognize income upon pledging the note as collateral for a loan. The
proposed rules were designed to correct perceived inadequacies in existing laws. See DEPT
OF TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS 14.
This Article focuses only on the repeal of installment sale reporting for accrual basis tax-
payers.
128 2000 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 127, at 77.
129 The President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
106th Cong. (Apr. 27, 1999) (statement of Donald Lubick, Ass't Treas. Sec. (Tax Policy))
[hereinafter Lubick testimony].
ISO Interestingly, in the first round of fiscal year 2000 tax legislation, the Senate in-
cluded the repeal of the installment reporting for accrual method taxpayers in a category
labeled loophole closers." See S. REP. No. 106-120, at 200-01 (1999).
191 According to the President's budget estimates, repeal of installment reporting for
accrual method taxpayers would increase total federal revenues by approximately $2 bil-
lion for years 2000-2004.2000 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 127, at 88 tbl.3-3.
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From this point on, the proposed repeal of installment reporting
for accrual method taxpayers took some interesting twists and turns
and ultimately became a pawn in complex negotiations over the
budget for fiscal year 2000. The story begins with the Republican
leadership's efforts to enact $792 billion in tax cuts, largely through
extensions or expansions of existing tax breaks. The House and Sen-
ate both passed the $792 billion legislation extending the tax breaks
despite President Clinton's announced intentions to veto it. 132 In the
first round, both the House and Senate versions of the bill, as well as
the ultimate version after conference, included Clinton's proposed
repeal of installment method reporting for accrual method taxpay-
ers. 133 In fact, the Republican Congress expressly used the installment
sale provision as one of several revenue offsets to pay for their tax
cuts."4
Although Congress presented the President with a bill including
numerous provisions that he favored, the Republican tax cuts in-
cluded in the bill were simply too bloated for him to accept. Backed
by a five-piece brass band playing taps, the President vetoed the legis-
lation as promised."5 In his veto message, Clinton lamented that Re-
publicans were using a risky tax cut to undermine the fiscal discipline
that had helped create recent budget surpluses. More significantly, he
complained that the
bill would not meet the Budget Act's existing pay-as-you-go
requirements, which have helped provide the discipline nec-
essary to bring us from an era of large and growing budget
deficits to the potential for substantial surpluses. It would
132
 The text of the installment sale repeal clause from Senate Bill 1429, The Taxpayer
Refund and Relief Act of 1999 (106th Cong. § 1313 (1999)), was inserted into House Bill
2488 (106th Cong. (1999)), and sent to the President for his signature.
153
 H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. (1999). Congressman Archer reports that he reluctantly
agreed to include the measure in the first bill only after assurances from the White House
and Treasury Department that the provision was non-controversial. Telephone interview
with Bill Archer, former Chair, House Ways and Means Comm. (Mar. 26, 2002) (notes on
file with the author).
im H.R. 2488, at tit. XV ("Revenue Offset Provisions").
135
 Ryan J. Don moyer & Heidi Glenn, After Veto, White House Dismisses GOP Extenders Bill,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Sept. 24, 1999) ("At a Rose Garden veto ceremony attended by key
economic advisers and cabinet members as well as the brass band, Clinton complained the
GOP tax bill was 'too big, too bloated, [and] places too great a burden on America's econ-
omy.").
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also automatically trigger across-the-board cuts (or seques-
ters) in a number of Federal programs. 1%
The President did, however, suggest that he was willing to negotiate
on a smaller bill that he might be willing to sign.'"
In symbolic tit-for-tat shortly after the presidential veto, the Re-
publicans sponsored a vote unanimously rejecting President Clinton's
proposed revenue-raising provisions. 138 In a second vote, a motion to
bring the vetoed legislation to the Senate floor to force a vote to sus-
tain or override the veto was successfully tabled.'" Now on the second
time around, Senate Finance Committee Chair William Roth and
House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Archer immediately
began work on a smaller package of tax break "extenders." 14° In order
to comply with the mandates of the budget reconciliation process and
PAYGO, however, any tax breaks had to be offset with revenue-raising
provisions to "pay for" the extenders. Again, one of the largest reve-
nue-raising offsets included in the Senate bill was the repeal of the
installment method for most accrual method taxpayers, expected to
raise approximately $2 billion over ten years. The challenge for the
Senate, however, was that the offsets were likely to be "vehemently
opposed by House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Archer." 141
The Senate ultimately passed The Tax Relief Extension Act of 1999,
including the installment method repeal in Title II, along with other
revenue offset provisions. 142 The original House tax bill, on the other
hand, did not include the installment provision. 143 The administration
was heavily involved in last-minute negotiations on the final confer-
136 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF TIIE U.S. TRANSMITTING 111S VETO OF 11.R. 2488,
-DIE TAXPAYER REFUND AND RELIEF ACT OF 1999, H.R. Doc. No. 106-130.
137 Id.
158 Heidi Glenn, Politics on Display in Tax Bill Votes, TAx Noma TODAY (Oct. 20, 1999).
139 Id.
140 These were tax deductions or credits that were otherwise due to sunset. Among the
largest of the "extender" provisions pushed by Republicans was the research credit. See
H.R. 2923, 106th Cong. (1999) ("Extension of Expiring Provisions"); see also discussion in
Ryan J. Donmoyer & Heidi Glenn, Roth, Moynihan Pare Extenders to 18 Months, Aides Say,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 13, 1999).
141 Ryan J. Donmoyer, Finance Prepares to Mark Up Extended Extenders Bill, TAx NOTES
TODAY (Oct. 20, 1999). Archer reports that by the second time around, his staff began to
get concerned about the impact of the proposed repeal of the installment method for
accrual method taxpayers. Telephone interview with Bill Archer, supra note 133.
142 S. 1702, 106th Cong. § 210 (1999).
145
 Extension of Expiring Provisions, H.R. 2923, 106th Cong. (1999); The Ticket to
Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 1180, 106th Cong. (1999).
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ence package that went back to both chantbers. 144 White House nego-
tiators apparently convinced House Republicans to leave the Senate
installment sale repeal provision in the final bill as a revenue offset in
exchange for some of the revenue-losing tax extenders the Republi-
cans wanted. 145 In the final conference, the House ultimately agreed
to include the installment sale repeal, which ultimately became § 536
of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of
1999. 146
 This provision was clearly part of the PAYGO offset package
necessary to pay for the revenue-losing tax extenders.
Almost before the ink was dry on the President's signature on the
Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act, efforts were
underway to repeal the installment sale repeal provision. Complaints
quickly developed from small businesses, which argued that requiring
them to report immediate taxable income from an installment sale
would adversely affect their ability to sell business assets. Lobbying
groups came crawling out of the woodwork to complain on behalf of
the small businesses.147 Interest groups began extensive letter-writing
campaigns, a bill was introduced to repeal the provisions, and hear-
ings were scheduled. 148 Congressman Bill Archer wrote a letter to
President Clinton asking him to "direct the Treasury to issue immedi-
144 The last-minute negotiations with the Treasury Department and the White House
were informal negotiations over the telephone. Congressman Archer recalls speaking with
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers from the cloakroom off the House floor about
adding the installment sale repeal provision from the Senate bill to the House bill as part
of the conference agreement. Telephone interview with Bill Archer, supra note 133.
145 Telephone interview with Rachel Sage, House Ways and Mean Committee tax staff
(Mar. 7, 2001) (notes on file with the author); Telephone interview with Paul Potete, Tax
Legislative Assistant to Congressman Wally Herger (Mar. 7, 2001) (confirming that he
heard that Treasury people were really pushing the original installment provision at con-
ference) (notes on file with the author).
146 H.R. 1180; H.R. REP. No. 106-478 (1999).
1147
 Included among these groups were the National Federation of Independent Busi-
nesses (NFIB), NFIB Release Endorsing Installment Correction Act, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 10,
2000); the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), NAM Release Praising Archer Ac-
tion on Installment Sales Method, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 31, 2000) [hereinafter NAM Re-
'easel; the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), AICPA Release Urg-
ing Repeal of Installment Sales Tax Rule, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 1, 2000); and broker
associations, Brokers Oppose Repeal of Installment Method for Accrual Taxpayers, TAX NO•l'ES
TODAY (Feb. 10, 2000).
148
 Hearings on MR. 3594 Before the House Comm on Small Business, 106th Cong. (Apr. 5,
2000) (testimony of Pamela F. Olson on behalf of the American Bar Association Tax Sec-
tion); id. (testimony of John S. Satagaj on behalf of the Small Business Legislative Coun-
cil). U.S. Chamber of Commerce representatives also testified in favor of repealing the
recent installment sale provision. Repeal of the Installment Method of Accounting for Accrual
Basis Taxpayers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, House Comm. on Ways and Means,
106th Cong. (Feb. 29, 2000) (statement of Darryl A. Hill, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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ate guidance providing relief for small businesses and include a legis-
lative relief provision in [the] fiscal 2001 budget proposal." 149
At hearings on the proposed retroactive repeal, even the Treas-
ury Department conceded that the new provision would impose harsh
burdens on some small businesses. Although the Treasury Depart-
ment did not support outright repeal of the controversial provision,
Treasury representatives agreed to work with Congress toward "a legis-
lative solution to alleviate this unforeseen impact of the provision. "150
The Treasury Department ultimately did respond with a Revenue
Procedure announcing that "the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
will exercise his discretion to except a qualifying taxpayer with aver-
age annual gross receipts of $1 million or less from the requirements
.. to use an accrual method of accounting for purposes of purchases
and sales of merchandise. "151
In the Installment Tax Correction Act of 2000, Congress ulti-
mately voted to "repeal the repeal" of installment accounting for ac-
crual method taxpayers retroactively. In sharp contrast to the huge
budget legislation of which the original repeal was a part, the Act is
remarkably brief:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Installment Tax Correction
Act of 2000."
SECTION 2. REPEAL OF MODIFICATION OF INSTALL-
MENT METHOD
(a) In General.—Subsection (a) of section 536 of the
Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of
1999 (relating to modification of installment method and
repeal of installment method for accrual method taxpayers)
is repealed effective with respect to sales and other disposi-
tions occurring on or after the date of enactment of such
Act.
(b) Applicability.—The Internal Revenue Code of 1986
shall be applied and administered as if that subsection (and
the amendments made by that subsection) had not been en-
acted. 152
149 NAM Release, supra note 147.
15° Mikrut testimony, supra note 126.
151 Rev. Proc. 2000-22, 2000-1 C.B. 1008.
162 Pub. L. No. 106-573, 2000 U.S.C.CA.N. (114 Stat.) 3061.
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This legislative language is really quite remarkable. Congress is
essentially saying, "We were just kidding, folks. Let's just pretend it
never happened." What makes this all the more remarkable is that the
retroactive repeal of § 453(a) (2) passed in the House on December
15, 2000, under a suspension-of-the-rules procedure, without ever hav-
ing been reported by committee, and passed in the Senate on the
same date by unanimous consent. 153 The House suspension of the
rules procedure generally enables the House "to act quickly on bills
that enjoy overwhelming but not unanimous support." 154 In addition
to the formal House Manual rules, however, the Speaker of the House
generally is guided by party rules. Both the Democratic Caucus and
the Republican Conference have adopted party rules under which
bills should be bipartisan, have strong committee support, and cost
less than $100 million before being considered under suspension-of-
the-rules procedures. The Republican Conference, for example, pro-
vides that "[t]he Speaker shall not schedule any bill or resolution for
consideration under suspension of the Rules which ... has not been
cleared by the minority, was opposed by more than one-third of the
committee members reporting the bill, or exceeds $100 million in
authorizations, appropriations, or direct spending."155 The House ap-
parently waived this rule in considering the over $1 billion "Correc-
tion Act" under a suspension-of-the-rules procedure. Moreover, Presi-
dent Clinton, who had originally proposed the installment sale
reporting change, quickly and quietly signed the repeal into law on
' 53 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEG-
ISLATION ENACTED IN TIIE 106TH CONGRESS, JCS-2-01, at 176 n.196 (Comm. Print 2001)
[hereinafter Joni' Comm. GEN. EXPLANATION].
154
 STANLEY BACH, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE HOUSE FLOOR: AN INTRODUC-
TION, CRS Rep. 95-563, at 3 (Judy 30, 1996). A motion to suspend the rules permits a bill
to bypass the general calendar rules and be brought directly to the floor of the House of
Representatives for a vote. The Speaker of the House may entertain such motions only on
Mondays and Tuesdays during the last six days of a session of Congress. The motion re-
quires a two-thirds vote for passage. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES R. XV, cl.
1(a). It may not be amended from the floor and is debatable for only forty minutes. M. at
cl. I (C).
1A4
	 of the Republican Conference, U.S. House of Representatives, 107th Cong.,
R. 28 (Guidelines on Suspensions of House Rules) (on file with the author). The Demo-
cratic Caucus uses a similar rule under which the Democratic Leadership will not consent
to consideration of a measure under suspension of the Rules that was "opposed by more
than one-third of any committee reporting it," Rules of the Democratic Caucus, U.S.
House of Representatives, 107th Congress, R. 38(A)(4), or "contains a cost estimate in
excess of $100,000,000 in any fiscal year," id. at R. 38(C). Similar party rules were in effect
for the 106th Congress.
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December 28, 2000. 156 The Joint Committee on Taxation projected
revenue loss from the "Correction Act" at $1.1 billion for 2001, with
total revenue losses over the period 2000-2010 projected to be over
$2 billion. 157
D. The Aftermath
The final results represent a troubling end-run around the rules
of the budget and tax legislative processes. Under PAYGO rules, any
revenue losses must be offset.'" Tax-writing committees generally op-
erate under rules that match revenue losers with revenue offsets in
the same bill. The 1999 Ticket to Work Act was no exception, includ-
ing one Title of "Tax Extenders" and another Title of "Revenue Off-
sets." To be sure, manipulative devices to get around PAYGO are noth-
ing new The devices used this time around, however, would make
even the Mad Hatter from Alice in Wonderland proud. Within fifteen
days after the close of the legislative session, OMB is required to issue
a final sequestration report including sequester requirements from
PAYGO violations.'" In compliance with this obligation, OMB esti-
mated that the Installment Sale Correction Act repeal would reduce
receipts by $2.3 billion over the period 2001-2005, which would ordi-
narily mandate a sequester.'"
Congress, however, had beaten OMB to the punch. By legislative
fiat, Congress had already declared that "the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall change any balance of direct spending
and receipts legislation for fiscal year 2001 . . . to zero. "161 This is a
156 See supra note 146.
157 JOINT COMM. ON TAX., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED HY
THE 106TII CONGRESS (JCS-2-01) app. 191 (Apr. 19, 2001) (Appendix: Estimated Budget
Effects of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 106th Congress). There is some discrepancy in
the budget numbers here, since the figures reported earlier were the President's budget
numbers reported by OMB over a five-year period, see supra note 131, while the revenue
estimates quoted here are Joint Committee on Taxation estimates over a ten-year period.
168 See supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
1" 2 U.S.C. § 904(0 (3) (2000).
166 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PaEs., OMB COST ESTIMATE FOR
PAY-As-You-Go CALCULATIONS, OMB REP. No. 550 (Jan. 1, 2001) [hereinafter OMB REP.
No. 550].
161 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 2(b), 2000
U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat.) 2763, 2763-64. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, H.R.
4577, 106th Cong., was first enacted by the House and Senate in June 2000 and ultimately
signed into law by the President on December 21, 2000, thus pre-dating the installment sale
repeal provision by seven days. The only cry of foul came from Senator Kerry in the Sen-
ate, who objected that
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congressional move known as "directed scorekeeping." Congress first
said, "We were just kidding, folks. We never did enact that revenue
offset provision even though it paid for over $2 billion in tax cuts."
Here it said, "We'll just call that $2.3 billion a zero for PAYGO pur-
poses and go home for the holidays."162 Ever compliant, OMB ended
its sequester report with the following: "NOTE: Pursuant to P.L. 106-
554, the pay-as-you-go balances that would result in a sequester for FY
2001 will be set to zero in OMB's final sequestration report." 163 Be-
cause the directed scorekeeping that set OMB's PAYGO scorecard to
zero predated the stand-alone installment repeal measure, Congress
was able to vote for the stand-alone repeal with assurance that it would
not be required to offset the cost under PAYGO rules. The stand-
alone Installment Tax Correction Act should have triggered a PAYGO
sequestration, but never did. In other words, Congress truly got its tax
cuts without ever having to pay for them.
III. PATHOLOGIES IN THE BUDGET AND TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
A. Budget Policy Principles
The federal budget process serves two major functions. First, it
serves as a promoter of government missions that are high on the gov-
ernment agenda. Second, the budget process operates as a constraint
upon spending. 164 At any given time, the focus of budget policy con-
cern may shift between its promoter and constraint functions depend-
ing upon economic conditions and the views of the political party in
[al II the way through the 1990s when we had this PAYGO provision in there,
we were able to maintain our fiscal discipline in spite of great pressure to do
the contrary. Whether it was tax cuts or spending increases that were being
proposed, we could maintain that discipline because every time we brought
an amendment down to the floor that spent more money or cut somebody's
taxes, we had to have an offset. That is the PAYGO provision. And we are go-
ing to throw it out the window, it seems to me, and we are going to abandon a
principle that has enabled us not just to balance our budget but to help pro-
duce the growth in our economy ....
146 CONG. REC. S11279 (2000) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
iss In fact, the directed scorekeeping here was not limited to the Installment Sale Cor-
rection Act, but was part of a larger bill setting the entire PAYGO scorecard for all direct
spending and receipts legislation for FY 2001 to zero. For further discussion, see infra note
235-236 and accompanying text.
163 OMB REP. No. 550, supra note 160.
164 SeejOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 106 (2d ed.
1995).
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power. As a general rule, however, most policy debate about the
budget process seems to focus upon its constraint functions.
The power of the purse is so momentous that, unlike other legis-
lation, the Constitution requires that all revenue bills originate in the
House. 165 The Founders thought of the House of Representatives as
closer to the People, more representative of their views, and thus, as
the more "democratic" of the two chambers of Congress. 166 Federalist
Paper No. 58 observed, "This power of the purse may, in fact, be re-
garded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for
obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect
every just and salutary measure." 167
Given the importance of the budget as a matter of national pol-
icy, I was surprised to discover that most of the literature on the
budget process jumps right into the process itself with precious little
consideration of larger policy objectives. The material that follows
seeks to fill that gap by offering a brief examination of background
budget policy principles before turning to a specific analysis of what
made the recent installment sale episode so troubling.
The GAO annual budget reports are among the few sources I
have uncovered that discuss background policy objectives. With very
little elaboration, the GAO reports submit that the budget process
should:
I. provide information on long-term budget impact;
2. provide information on important macro trade-offs;
3. provide information to make trade-offs among different
national policy needs or missions;
4. provide for enforceability, accountability, and transpar-
ency.'"
The first three of these goals can be grouped together, for my
purposes at least, as "information-related" goals. The fourth criterion
listed above actually contains a number of discrete policy objectives
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on
other Bills.").
166 CORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 553
(1969).
167 THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (James Madison).
168 See 2002 GAO BUDGET REPORT, supra note 21, at 37; 2001 GAO BUDGET REPORT,
supra note 27, at 34.
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that should be broken into distinct components. As a group, I will re-
fer to these criteria as "democracy-oriented" goals. In practical terms,
the information-related goals may be the most important concerns for
budget policy analysts. For purposes of this Article, however, my pri-
mary concern is with the democracy-oriented goals. The following
sections of the Article consider the importance of these latter goals as
applied to the budget process generally and examine the ways in
which these goals were violated in connection with the installment
sale case study in particular.
B. Democracy
-
Oriented Goals of the Budget Process
I. Budget Formation as a Democratic Exercise
One of the major milestones in federal budgeting over the past
two centuries169 was the President's Commission on Budget Concepts,
which introduced the notion of a unified budget in 1967.1" In its
chapter on Purposes of the Budget, the Commission pronounced:
The budget is the key instrument in national policymaking.
It is through the budget that the Nation chooses what areas
it wishes to leave to private choice and what services it wants
to provide through government. When enacted, the budget
expresses the decisions of the Nation's elected representa-
tives . . . .
Budget formulation is a highly political exercise in the
American democratic system, and it should not be otherwise.
It is therefore essential that the budget be understandable,
at least in broad outline, to as many of the public and their
elected representatives as possible. Wise fiscal policy and
wise choices for individual federal programs depend, in the
final analysis, on public and congressional understanding of
the budget.
While the public cannot be expected to become familiar
with all the details and intricacies of the budget, it must be
169 See SCHICK, supra note 1, at 15, box 2-1.
170 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS 11-18 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 COMMISSION RE-
PORT].
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able to participate intelligently in the big decisions that
come to focus there ... 171
My focus in this Article is on the democracy-oriented goals that will
best serve the public in understanding and participating in the
budget process. In addition to the goals identified by the GAO, I add
the goals of openness and durability. By isolating the democracy-
oriented goals from the information-related goals, I do not mean to
suggest that information is unrelated to the democracy function. For
the most part, however, I see the information-related goals as impor-
tant to budget analysts and policymakers dealing with the day-to-day
creation of the budget. That said, however, simplified versions of this
information must be available to the public as well so that the democ-
racy-oriented goals can be fulfilled. 172
2. Enforceability
According to the GAO, enforcement is simply "a mechanism to
enforce decisions once they are made" and "requires a system for
tracking outcomes and tying them to actions."173 Once Congress has
agreed to a budget resolution, these are the mechanisms such as
points of order, spending caps, and PAYGO rules that hold it to its
word. Congress has committed itself to these enforcement mecha-
nisms either by internal rules or statute. 174 I consider the proper func-
tioning of these enforcement tools as one of the democracy-oriented
goals of the budget process. Once Congress has promulgated a con-
current budget resolution, the electorate can and should expect its
representatives to stick to that budget according to the budget en-
forcement rules.
3. Accountability
Those responsible for the federal budget should ideally account
on two dimensions: (I) for the cost of budget commitments and en-
forcement actions taken; and (2) for the cost of unexpected event.s. 175
Because the power of the purse is given to the People, they should
171 Id. at 11.
172 This will be especially relevant with respect to the goal of transparency. See infra
notes 177-184 and accompanying text.
173 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET PROCESS: EVOLUTION AND CHALLENGES,
GAO/T—A1MD-96-129, at 12 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 GAO BUDGET PROCESS REPORT].
174 See supra notes 64-116 and accompanying text.
173 1996 GAO BUDGET PROCESS REPORT, supra note 173, at 12.
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expect a reasonable accounting from Congress. Scoring and costing
rules, projections on revenue impact, and similar rules are designed
to provide such accountability. These two dimensions of accountabil-
ity, referred to by the GAO, might more accurately be labeled economic
accountability. In effect, our legislators act as our bookkeepers and we
expect them to keep faithful accounts.
Another notion of accountability should be distinguished as po-
litical accountability. This concept focuses on legislators' responsive-
ness to the electorate. Thus, "accountable decisionmakers pay atten-
tion to the wishes of the people because they can be held responsible
for policy outcomes at election time. Furthermore, the decisions of an
accountable political entity are more legitimate and thus more deserv-
ing of respect by the governed. 476
4. Transparency
A final key goal mentioned by the GAO is that the budget should
be transparent, that is, it should be "understandable to those outside
the process."'" This can be a complex goal, sometimes requiring sim-
plicity, but at other times demanding "no hidden costs" or "few sur-
prises."178 The GAO language on transparency bears quoting in full:
Transparency is important because the budget debate is
critically important—not because of the numbers in it but
because it represents a statement about collective priorities
and collective action. In a democracy, the debate about these
priorities should be made as understandable as possible. If
even reasonably dedicated citizens cannot understand the
budget document or the budget debate, there is little ac-
countability.
If the budget debate is to/ be accessible to the American
people—or to any significant subset of the population—con-
sideration will have to be given to simplifying the structure
of the budget, streamlining the process, and reducing the
number of translations required to get from one part of the
process to another. .
176
 Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint, The Federal Budget Process and the Line
Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871,923 (1999).
177 1996 GAO BUDGET PROCESS REPORT, supra note 173, at 12.
178 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET PROCESS: COMMENTS ON H.R. 853,
GAO/T-A1MD-99-188, at 8 (1999).
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Citizens cannot be expected to feel a stake in the budget
debate—a debate that will affect all our lives and our na-
tional future—or to accept decisions made by others without
basic information. At a minimum citizens need to know how
much money the federal government takes in—and how—
and on what funds are spent. 179
The notion of transparency reflected here includes several com-
ponents. At a minimum, it incorporates the right of the public to in-
formation about the budget process in general and to information
about the specifics regarding any particular budget. Moreover, that
information should be offered in a simple format so that citizens who
choose to do so are able to engage in informed debate about the collec-
tive policy choices reflected in the budget debate.
Transparency goals clearly overlap or intersect with several oth-
ers. Although the primary focus of my discussion is democracy-
oriented goals, transparency surely requires that information be avail-
able to the public. The first of the specific GAO information-related
budget goals was that the budget process should provide information
on long-term budget impact.m This information is important to
budget analysts and some understandable version of the same infor-
mation should also be available to the public."' As the GAO suggests,
The President, the Congress, and the public need to think
about the longer term when making choices about the com-
position of federal activity. This is true for at least two rea-
sons: (1) each generation is in part custodian for the econ-
omy it hands the next and (2) some changes must be phased
in over long periods of time. 182
Thus, the public is entitled to information about the long-term impli-
cations of budget decisions. In addition, the public should have access
to information enabling it to understand and consider the trade-offs
178
	 1996 GAO BUDGET PROCESS REPORT, supra note 173, at 14-15.
480 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
181 The 1967 President's Commission on Budget Concepts made a similar observation:
Not only does the public need more up-to-date information about how the budget is
shaping up but it needs a further look ahead on the way Government expenditures and
tax receipts are likely to develop in future years." 1967 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
170, at 76.
In 1996 GAO BUDGET PROCESS REPORT, supra note 173, at 9. Although the current
budget already provides for a ten-year projection, see discussion supra notes 52-54 and
accompanying text, the GAO suggests looking at implications of budget decisions for as
long as thirty years. See id. at 9.
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between the appropriate amounts of investment and consumption
and the relative priority of competing national policy missions. 183
Transparency goals also overlap with accountability goals. If citi-
zens cannot even understand the budget, their legislators have not
been very responsive. As Professor Garrett also points out, "In the
budget context, transparency is particularly important because indi-
vidual decisions can be lost in the midst of detailed and obscurely
worded omnibus bills. In the absence of visibility, accountability is vir-
tually impossible. "184
5. Openness and Durability
To the goals mentioned in the GAO reports, I would like to add
two related democracy-oriented goals. First, and related to the goal of
transparency, the budget process should be open. If the public is to
understand fully and to participate in its power of the purse, it stands
to reason that decisions should be made openly and not behind
closed doors.
Second, the federal budget is the fundamental process through
which the nation makes its decisions about taxing and spending. It is
important for stability and for public morale that the budget process
rules be reasonably durable. Of course, Congress can change budget
process rules by amending the statutory provisions addressing budget
process and by internal amendments to House or Senate rules relat-
ing to the budget process. I refer to these as formal budget process
changes, which can, and should, be carefully considered through a
system of periodic reforms in which the public fully participates. Even
here, durability concerns mandate that major reforms not be consid-
ered too frequently.
A second type of budget process change involves congressional
use of different procedural rules from one annual concurrent budget
resolution to the next or congressional waiver of budget process re-
quirements. I refer to these as informal budget process changes. I con-
tend that frequent use of such devices violates democratic principles
of durability, and thus, such devices should rarely be used. Once Con-
gress has settled into a procedural pattern with respect to its concur-
rent budget resolutions, it should continue that pattern absent strong
reasons to depart from it.
153 Id. at 10; see supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing GAO goals).
189 Garrett, supra note 176, at 924.
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C. Assessing the Installment Sale Episode
1. Application of the Democracy-Oriented Criteria
a. Enforceability
The installment sale episode violated the goal of proper demo-
cratic use of budget process enforcement tools in numerous ways. By
enacting the Installment Tax Correction Act as a stand-alone measure,
the Senate effectively bypassed point-of-order rules that would ordi-
narily apply in the consideration of reconciliation legislation, particu-
larly rules applicable to changes that would cause the legislation to
violate principles of revenue neutrality. Overcoming these points of
order typically requires a three-fifths vote in the Senate. On the other
hand, because the stand-alone Installment Tax Correction Act was
presented to the Senate as an ordinary piece of legislation, it required
only a majority vote. 185 Whatever one may think of the Senate super-
majority vote requirements as a general principle, I contend that an
end run around the existing requirements for isolated pieces of legis-
lation in this fashion is unacceptable.
In addition to violating its own internal budget enforcement
rules, Congress also effectively broke statutory budget law. When Con-
gress set the PAYGO scorecard to zero, thus avoiding an otherwise
mandatory sequester of funds under the federal budget process rules,
it violated its own statutory budget enforcement rules. My argument
here is not that Congress acted illegally. Congress created the PAYGO
regime by statute and it apparently "violated" the same regime by stat-
ute. Congress here enacted a bizarre and wacky, but still legitimate,
statute in which it used directed scorekeeping to instruct OMB to ig-
nore the mandatory PAYGO sequestration rules and to pretend that
the figure to be used for sequestration purposes was zero. If Congress
can make the law, it can repeal it. In effect, and in a very indirect
manner, Congress repealed mandatory PAYGO rules for fiscal year
2000. My contention is that as a matter of democratic principle, the
legislators have not stuck to the terms of their original bargain. They
changed the terms of the deal at the last minute and they did not en-
185 Although the measure did, in fact, pass the Senate with a greater than three-fifths
vote, my concern here is with the precedent established by this maneuver around the
budget rules. In fact, the motion on the bill passed by a voice vote in the House, 146 Cong.
Rec. 1112097 (2000), and by unanimous consent in the Senate, 146 Cong. Rec. 511940
(2000).
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force the concurrent budget resolution as it was written. The public
can and should expect more from their elected representatives. 186
b. Economic Accountability
The cost of the stand-alone installment sale provision in terms of
projected revenue loss was actually $2.3 billion. By directing the OMB
to set the PAYGO scorecard to zero, this cost was eliminated from the
budget.'87 I expended considerable effort, with the assistance of a ref-
erence librarian, to trace the steps through which this accounting de-
vice occurred. Clearly, the ordinary citizen would not easily have had
access to this information. The installment sale episode thus illus-
trates a significant violation of economic accountability.
c. Political Accountability
The installment sale provision raises interesting questions about
accountability to the electorate in the budget and tax processes. In-
terest groups surely play a major role in both of these legislative proc-
esses. The initial repeal of installment reporting for accrual method
taxpayers was intended to close a perceived loophole and, theoreti-
cally, was in the interest of the taxpaying public at large. The measure
was viewed as horizontally equitable; 188 it also happened to raise fed-
eral revenue. Arguably, then, Congress was most responsive to the
taxpaying public when it first repealed the installment reporting for
accrual taxpayers. In the end, when Congress eliminated the repeal, it
was responding to heavy lobbying pressure from small business inter-
ests. The repeal of the repeal ultimately can be viewed as a special in-
terest measure that ultimately lost revenue from the budget. Congress
violated the goal of political accountability.
d. Transparency
Perhaps the key violation reflected in the installment sale case
study is in the principle of transparency. The installment sale provi-
sion was a small piece of a large omnibus budget package and did not
receive much attention. Many legislators themselves were unaware
186 See infra notes 239-246 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
188 For tax purposes, the principle of horizontal equity generally demands that simi-
larly situated taxpayers should pay the same tax. Put slightly differently, those with equal
incomes should pay equal tax. See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UmraxouNc. THE INCOME Tax 151
(1986).
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that the installment sale provision was even in the omnibus legislation
in the first place)" Even with my years of personal expertise in teach-
ing and researching in the tax area, it took me days of research and
"investigative reporting" to track down the events that transpired in
connection with the Installment Sale Correction Act. 190 Contrary to
GAO's description of the transparency goal, the installment sale story
included several surprises and hidden costs. 191 Obviously, understand-
able information was not available to permit the public to engage in
debate on the installment sale measure.
e. Openness
A related major concern with the installment sale episode is its
lack of openness. As just mentioned, the provision was a small piece of
legislation buried, and probably lost from view, in a large omnibus
budget package. More significant to the democracy-oriented principle
of openness, however, most number gimmicks are out on the table for
all to see at the outset. For example, lawmakers have increasingly used
techniques to delay the imposition of costs so that they are outside the
relevant budget window while speeding up receipts so that they are
within the budget window. Also, because several different staffs pre-
pare budget numbers, lawmakers often play the numbers game, using
the numbers that best serve their case.192 In each of these cases, how-
ever, the gimmicks are used from the start and open to public scrutiny
and challenge.
In contrast, the installment sale case study was closed from be-
ginning to end. The installment sale provision that was initially in-
cluded in the omnibus budget bill was inserted at the last minute be-
hind closed doors as part of a compromise between negotiators for
the administration and House Republicans. 193 The subsequent In-
stallment Sale Correction Act was a stand-alone measure done after
189 Telephone interview with Paul Potete, supra note 145.
190 In fact, the inspiration for this Article began as I was working on a new edition for a
book on corporate taxation. My editorial changes for the book got caught in the middle of
the budgetary process. I had changed all of the problems in my book to reflect the repeal
of the installment method for accrual method taxpayers, only to discover that the repeal
had been repealed. We were too late in the editorial process to do anything but place a
notice in the front of the book. CHERYL D. BLOCK, CORPORATE TAXATION: EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS viii (2d ed. 2001).
191 See GAO language quoted supra in text accompanying note 179.
192 For a useful description of the disagreements in methodology and the problems
these disagreements can create, see, for example, Graetz, supra note 3.
l" See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text,
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the entire budget deal had already been worked out. This stand-alone
measure unraveled part of the budget deal after the fact. In addition,
the separate measure through which Congress directed OMB to set
the PAYGO scorecard to zero was also arranged after the budget deal
had already been worked out. Neither of these deals was on the table
at the outset available for public scrutiny. Moreover, the directed
scorekeeping legislation makes no specific reference to the install-
ment sale provision. It would be difficult for the general public to put
the pieces together and figure out that the offsets agreed to as part of
the budget deal to cover the cost of tax cuts had never been paid.
f. Durability
The installment sale episode raises two durability issues. First, as
to the tax provision itself, Congress passed a law, which the public
thought would be effective, and then retroactively repealed it as if it
had never existed.194 This circumstance is obviously confusing and
difficult for taxpayers and should be avoided. Congress passed a law
that lived but for a brief moment and then disappeared.
Second, whenever Congress directs the OMB to set the PAYGO
scorecard to zero, it is repealing PAYGO as a practical matter without
technically repealing PAYGO from the statute. This permits Congress
to have its cake and eat it too. It can comply with PAYGO when it suits
its purposes to do so and simply direct OMB to set the scorecard to
zero, thus avoiding the PAYGO sequester, when it wants to avoid
PAYGO. Although Congress sets the scorecard to zero through a
proper statute presented to the President and signed into law, I con-
tend that such actions violate democratic principles of durability,
transparency, and openness.
g. Unified Budget
A final concern with the stand-alone installment sale provision is
that it is inconsistent with the fundamental logic of the budget proc-
ess in the first instance. The idea of the congressional budget process
as it was established by the CBA in 1974 was to set up a comprehen-
sive, unified budget process and to encourage coordination and cen-
tralization. 195 As a former director of the CBO and his co -author de-
scribed it, "[I]t is not clear that the procedures of the pre-1974 era
194 See supra notes 147-157 and accompanying text.
1 " OLESZEK, supra note 78, at 56.
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should be dignified with the label 'process.'"198 The CBA was designed
to eliminate the old fragmented, piecemeal approach, which con-
strained Congress's ability to make comprehensive policy. The stand-
alone Installment Tax Correction Act harkens back to the old piece-
meal approach and is entirely inconsistent with fundamental underly-
ing notions of the federal budget process.'"
2. Power to Party Leaders at the Expense of Rank-and-File Members
Over different periods in congressional history, the relative
power of individual rank-and-file members, committees, committee
chairs, and party leaders has varied. Particularly since the 1994 sweep
when Republicans took control over the House of Representatives,
the balance of power has shifted to party leaders. 198 The Republicans
incorporated numerous changes, such as allowing the Speaker to
handpick committee chairs, rather than basing chairs on seniority.'"
Internal reforms frequently permit party leaders to bypass committees
to move legislation directly to the floor.200 Scholars have suggested
that the budget process will continue and strengthen the shift in
power away from the rank-and-file members to the party leaders. The
installment sale case study confirms this view.
With respect to the budget process in particular, Professor
Garrett identifies three features that strengthen the power of the ma-
jority party. First, she argues that the centralized framework of the
budget process gives increased power to the political party, another
centralizing institution. 291 Second, she argues that the reconciliation
process shifts power away from committees and allows leaders to ma-
nipulate the process. 282 Finally, she contends that the budget rules set
the stage for stalemates, which are often resolved through summit ne-
gotiations. Summit negotiations typically involve party leaders at the
expense of individual members of Congress or committee chairs. 205
Reconciliation procedures that severely limit floor activity in the Sen-
ate204 may reduce the autonomy and power of substantive committees,
196 Joyce & Reischauer, supra note 44, at 430.
127 See, e.g., 1967 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 170.
198 See, e.g., BURDETT LOOMIS, THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS 128-29 (1996).
'" See discussion in Ot.ESZEK, supra note 78, at 301.
209 See SINCLAIR, supra note 9, at 94.
20' Garrett, supra note 20, at 707.
2°2 Id,
202 Id.
204 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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causing those committees to report legislation different from what
they would have chosen if they had the power to shape the legislation
themselves. "[T]he majority party and the President . . . exert greater
control over the shape of the budget resolution and overall fiscal pol-
icy than any other entities."205 Naomi Caiden observed these tenden-
cies even earlier in a 1984 article describing the budget as broken into
two large packages dealing with discretionary and mandatory spend-
ing. She noted that "Mlle trend toward budget packages also has a
marked effect on budgetary politics in Congress. It strengthens the
hand of the congressional leadership which sets the agenda for de-
bate through its construction of viable packages:12w
If all of these observations are true about the budget process
generally, they are all the more true with respect to the negotiations
leading to the last-minute inclusion in conference of the repeal of the
installment sale method for accrual method taxpayers as part of the
Ticket to Work and Work Incentive Improvement Act of 1999, which
led to the almost immediate repeal of the repeal in the Installment
Tax Correction Act. Although most rank-and-file members of Con-
gress probably were unaware of the events leading up to the Install-
ment Tax Correction Act, one suspects that party leaders were well
aware of all developments. Thus, the installment sale story is consis-
tent with literature suggesting that power has increasingly shifted away
from individual members of the House and Senate and even away
from committee chairs to the party leadership. Most observers view
this shift in power with some alarm. 207 In the recent installment sale
episode, it appears that the party leadership was well aware of what
was going on, and participated actively in the conference negotiations
and negotiations with the President. This might not all be so trou-
bling, if the original provision hadn't been used to offset tax cuts that
the rank-and-file were probably well aware of.
3. Losing Tax Policy in the Shuffle
Many pieces of tax legislation, both large and small, are enacted
as part of the budget process. The repeal of the installment sale re-
porting for accrual method taxpayers was no exception. Tax policy-
270 Garrett, supra note 20, at 723.
206 Caiden, supra note 49, at 113.
207
 But see Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. Rev. 917 (1990) [hereinafter Can Ignorance Be
Bliss?]; Michael A. Fins, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms
of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988).
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makers generally assess tax legislation according to three major policy
norms: fairness, simplicity, and efficiency. 208 Fairness, or equity, is
based upon the notion that tax burdens should be distributed accord-
ing to one's ability to pay. It is, of course, the most critical tax policy
norm. The notion of ability to pay usually is further broken into two
distinct concepts. The first, horizontal equity, demands that those with
equal incomes pay equal tax. 209
 If certain items are omitted from the
tax base, taxpayers with those receipts are treated preferentially and
the ideal of horizontal equity is violated. Tax policy issues regarding
horizontal equity generally relate to the tax base—debates over re-
ceipts that are, or should be, subject to tax. Vertical equity, on the
other hand, demands that those with higher incomes pay higher tax.
Although most agree with vertical equity as a matter of principle, con-
troversy continues over the extent to which those with higher incomes
should pay more tax. Tax policy issues regarding vertical equity gen-
erally relate to tax rates and tend to be far more controversial.
As initially proposed in the President's budget, the repeal of in-
stallment reporting for accrual method taxpayers was allegedly in-
tended to close a loophole. 210 The idea was to improve the measure-
ment of income and to incorporate a tax change that would increase
the horizontal equity of the Tax Code. As Treasury Department repre-
sentatives testified, the measure was, in part, designed to eliminate a
method of accounting that was providing "disparate treatment among
similarly situated taxpayers."211 The provision also turned out to be a
useful negotiating device from the budget perspective; revenue esti-
mates projected an approximately $2.3 billion revenue increase.212
Soon thereafter, however, tax principles were abandoned as the
executive and congressional branches alike used the provision as a
revenue-raising offset in the budget game to pay for tax cuts. No one
cared much about tax policy. One of the key pathologies at the inter-
section of the budget and tax legislative processes is that any sem-
blance of tax policy has gotten completely lost. Tax provisions have
become a mere pawn in the processes. Professor Graetz complains
that the budget process has elevated the significance of estimated
20B
	 e.g., OFFICE OF THE SEC., DEPT OF THE TREAS., TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIM-
PLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO TIIE PRESIDENT
(1984). This major report on tax reform ultimately led to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
209 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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revenue impacts of proposed tax legislation and points out that "[a]
politician ... is behaving quite reasonably ... when her dominant
concern in considering tax legislation is making the revenue numbers
`come out right.' The diminished capacity of the traditional norma-
tive concerns of taxation—fairness, economic efficiency, and simplic-
ity—to influence legislation in this context is not surprising."2 t'
Economists have raised similar complaints. Gene Steuerle, for exam-
ple, protests that because Congress started focusing on deficit reduc-
tion, it has
operated under a set of rules that typically require increased
revenue to accompany expenditure increases, or some
amount of tax increase to accompany a deficit reduction
package. As a matter of budget policy, these rules have suc-
ceeded in gradually reducing the budget deficit, although
not as much as desired. As a matter of tax policy, however; the
rules have not worked well, and the tax code is again being made
more complex and more unfair with the passage of each new act.
What the new methods have implied is scant attention to tax
policy principles. In many cases there is not even time for
hearings on the tax changes being considered. 214
The installment sale case is a good illustration of this particular pa-
thology at work.
D. Two Possible Explanations for the Retroactive Repeal of the Repeal Episode
I. The Honest Mistake
The most innocent explanation for the retroactive repeal of the
repeal episode is simply that the players were genuinely unaware of
the magnitude of the impact of the repeal with respect to small busi-
ness owners. Many rank-and-file members of Congress were caught
unaware by the controversy over the installment sale reporting provi-
sion. They apparently had no idea of the tax burden that would be
imposed by § 536 of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives hn-
provement Act. Many lobbyists also claim to have been caught coin-
213 Graetz, supra note 3, at 763.
214
 Gene Steuerle, Fair Budget Policy, Bad Tax Policy, 44 'FAx NOTES 455, 455 (1989)
(emphasis added).
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pletely by surprise. 215 For example, in a letter to the Secretary of the
Treasury, a small business lobbyist wrote, "Simply put, if the full im-
pact of this provision had been known, it would never have become
law in the first place."216 Bill Archer, then-Chair of the House Ways
and Means Committee, reports that in the first round of legislation,
the House bill included the installment sale provision because he and
his staff were unaware of the impact on small businesses. It was only in
considering the second bill after the President's veto that his staff be-
gan to raise questions and he had second thoughts, causing him to
insist on deleting the measure from the House bill in the second
round.217
Oddly enough, even the Treasury Department itself claims to
have been caught somewhat off-guard. After the 1999 Act was passed,
lobbying groups began a simultaneous assault on Congress and the
Treasury Department. Although the Treasury Department continued
to claim that installment reporting was inconsistent with accrual
method reporting, Treasury Department representatives conceded
that
the extent of the impact of the provision on the sales of
small businesses apparently was unforeseen by policymakers
and potentially affected taxpayers and their advisors during
the legislative process. We now understand that the legisla-
tion has imposed financial burdens on small businesses that
override the basic tax policy concern. As such, we are eager
to work with Congress to provide a legislative solution to al-
leviate this unforeseen impact of the provision. 218
Even if one accepts the "honest mistake" explanation of events,
the installment sale episode potentially reveals flaws in the current
515 One lobbyist explained that they were not even aware that the installment. sale pro-
vision had been incorporated into the bill until after the President had signed it. It was
only then that they "got busy." Telephone interview with Dan Blinkenberg, lobbyist for the
National Federation of Independent. Businesses (Mar. 7, 2001) (notes on file with the
author).
2" Letter to Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary of the Treasury, from D. Scot Bowers,
Live Oak Capital Advisors, Inc., reprinted in Brokers Oppose Repeal of Installment Method for
Accrual Taxpayers, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 10, 2000) (letter written on behalf of a long list
of business lobbying organizations, including National Federation of Independent Busi-
nesses, Small Business Legislative Council, National Association of Manufacturers, Na-
tional Association of Realtors, Small Business Council of America, et. al).
517 Telephone interview with Bill Archer, supra note 133; see also supra notes 141-143
and accompanying text.
2111 Mikrut testimony, supra note 126.
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budget and tax legislative processes that warrant attention. First, in
and of itself, the fact that a piece of legislation with such an appar-
ently large impact on a particular interest group could slip quietly
through is troubling. Those with an active interest in particular legis-
lation should have an opportunity to participate in the process. At a
minimum, legislative efficiency concerns suggest that mechanisms
should be in place to insure that interested groups are aware of pend-
ing legislation that might affect them and should have an opportunity
to speak in advance rather than being forced to lobby for repeal of
legislation after it is enacted. Interestingly, the installment sale epi-
sode is contrary to expectations from the political science literature,
which generally suggests that it is much easier to block legislation from
passage than it is to repeal legislation once enacted. 219
The installment sale story should raise particular concerns for
those who adhere to a deliberative model of the legislative process. 2"
The installment sale provision squeaked quietly by with virtually no
attention at all. 221 One might argue that this is a concern with respect
to omnibus and reconciliation legislation generally, which incorpo-
rates such a large volume of material covering so many different areas
of law that it would be virtually impossible for any single member of
Congress to be fully informed on the entire bill. Many political scien-
tists and others have made such observations. For example, Barbara
Sinclair notes:
219 See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 19, at 314-15. Moreover, as a general rule,
groups generally work harder to preserve what they have than to gain a new benefit. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179-81 (1997).
1-lere, however, the group "benefiting" from the installment sale repeal in the first place
was arguably the broad general public. The subsequent retroactive repeal of the repeal was
advocated by a small, concentrated group of small business lobbyists with little or no oppo-
sition from the general public, which would have to overcome massive collective action
problems to mount a serious campaign to block the effort. For a wonderful book on the
difficulties of large, diffuse groups overcoming collective action problems, see MANCUR
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965).
220 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
(1996) (discussing the moral dimensions of deliberative democracy); Symposium on Republi-
canism, 97 YALE U. 1539, 1493-1723 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
221 Although many claim to have known nothing about the provision at the time, there
were apparently hearings on the overall budget, at which the installment sale provision was
briefly discussed. See, e.g., Hearings on the FY 2000 Budget: House Ways and Means Comm.,
106th Cong. (Mar. 10, 1999) (testimony of William T. Sinclaire, Senior Tax Counsel & Dir.
of Tax Policy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) [hereinafter Sinclaire testimony].
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Reconciliation bills make a multitude of policy decisions
through an abbreviated legislative process in which many
provisions receive limited scrutiny. No committee hearings
may have been held on the changes included in the legisla-
tion. With the committees operating under time constraints,
many provisions may have received only perfunctory atten-
tion ditring committee markup; as part of a much larger
package, they may have been altogether ignored during the
floor debate. In fact, most members may not have been
aware of many of them. Yet the provisions in a reconciliation
bill are very likely to become law. Simply the size of the
package tends to take attention away from any but the most
major provisions. 222
Although these observations generally are true of all reconcilia-
tion or omnibus bills, they are particularly troubling in the install-
ment sale repeal story. As part of a large reconciliation package, the
individual installment sale repeal provision was easily overlooked by
many, if not most, individual members of Congress. At the same time,
however, the measure was used to pay for popular tax cuts. Members
didn't much care how they were getting the desired tax cuts as long as
they were assured that they were being paid for by appropriate reve-
nue offsets under the PAYGO provisions. After the fact, however, when
they were able to focus their attention on the installment sale provi-
sion in isolation, they realized what had been done and happily voted
for the stand-alone repeal.
2. A "Wink and a Nod" and the Art of the Deal
The "honest mistake" explanation of the events that transpired in
connection with the installment sale repeal story is likely to be met
with a healthy degree of skepticism.223 Given the speed with which the
222 SINCLAIR, supra note 9, at 76.
1" In any event, the presence of the installment sale repeal proposal for accrual
method taxpayers in the President's budget was not completely lost on all interest groups.
Although very little attention was paid to the provision in initial consideration of the
President's budget, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce did devote two sentences of its early
testimony on the budget to this provision, calling it one of the administration's "objection-
able" revenue raisers. Sinclaire testimony, supra note 221 (before the House Ways and
Means Committee). Moreover, Bill Archer, then-Chair of the House Ways and Means
Committee, was sufficiently concerned to leave the repeal measure out of the House ver-
sion of the second bill before it went to conference. Telephone interview with Bill Archer,
supra note 133.
916	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 43:863
lobbyists and Congressman Archer began their efforts to repeal the
provision, it appears that at least the Republican leadership was fully
aware of the provision and its impact. The game was simply too skill-
fully played for most observers to believe that the inclusion of the in-
stallment sale repeal provision in the first place was a mere oversight.
Moreover, there were ongoing reports that the installment sale
repeal provision was among the largest of the revenue raisers being
targeted for use as a revenue offset to pay for the numerous tax cuts
included in the form of "extenders. " 224 Given these reports, it is also
surprising that lobbyists were so quiet until after the bill was passed.
There is some suggestion that lobbyists were assured that the provi-
sion would be deleted and that they had nothing to worry about. 225
Worse still, lobbyists may have been in on the whole complex scheme
to let the bill go through and use the provision as a revenue offset,
with the assurance that the Republicans had the votes to repeal the
provision immediately as a stand-alone measure. Moreover, it appears
that party leaders in the end believed that they could comfortably vote
for the bill without worrying about PAYGO sequesters. In addition to
repealing the installment sale provision, Republicans also knew that
they had the votes to bypass the PAYGO rules through a direction to
OMB setting the PAYGO scorecard to zero.
As opposed to the honest mistake explanation, the "wink and a
nod" explanation suggests that Republican leaders probably knew all
along that when they did draw attention to the cost impact of the in-
stallment sale repeal on small businesses, they had the votes to repeal
the provision retroactively. They may have even told the lobbyists to
keep quiet. How wonderful it would be not only to repeal the un-
wanted installment sale targeted offset retroactively, but get away
without ever being required to pay for over $2 billion of the tax ex-
tenders. One mysterious question is why President Clinton went along
so willingly with his signature at the end of the day. One suspects that
224
 See, for example, reports that "Roth proposed more than 20 revenue-raisers, all of
which have been seen before. The biggest, raising $2 billion over 10 years, would repeal
the installment method for most accrual-basis taxpayers ...." Ryan J. Donmoyer, Finance
Prepares to Mai* Up Extended Extenders Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 20, 1999). Another arti-
cle looking at available offsets to pay for tax cuts specifically referred to the installment
sale repeal as already "eaten up." Ryan J. Domnoyer & Heidi Glenn, Revenue Offset Leftovers
May Give K Sheet Indigestion, TAx NOTES TODAY (Nov. 24, 1999).
225 One lobbyist reported that interest groups never took the threat of the installment
sale repeal for accrual basis taxpayers proposal seriously because they believed the Repub-
licans would never pass it. They believed that "Congress would take care of it." Telephone
interview with Dan Blankenberg, supra note 215.
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additional deals were cut there as well—deals we may never know
about.
Some may argue that the installment sale story is a unique and
unusual incident. In certain respects, of course, this is true. We are
unlikely to see statutes regularly that appear and then disappear like
fairy dust as if they had never existed. If this was simply a bizarre aber-
ration, it would not be worthwhile as a case study. Despite some of its
unusual characteristics, however, the events that transpired reflect
deeper pathologies in the tax and budget legislative processes, par-
ticularly with regard to dealmaking that goes into the budget. Tax pol-
icy often gets lost along the way as these budget deals are made. The
sections that follow consider these pathologies.
E. Dealmaking and the Budget
I. The Costs of PAYGO
Although observers might disagree about whether the costs out-
weigh the benefits, any observer of the modern budget process would
agree that the fiscal constraints imposed by the enforcement of reve-
nue neutrality principles have increased the costs of enacting new tax
legislation and have dramatically altered the dynamics of the proc-
ess.226
Legislative procedural innovations, especially the various offset
provisions built into the reconciliation and PAYGO process, dramati-
cally altered the dynamics of interest group activity and conflict. Lob-
byists advocating new spending programs or tax cuts have become
"funding predators," each in search of target programs to cut or al-
ternative taxes to increase so as to pay for their new proposals. 227 Play-
ers in the budget and tax legislative processes cut deals, each laboring
to keep the proposed legislation within the confines of complicated
budget requirements, while advocating their own interests. The play-
ers here are not limited to private, interest groups, but include indi-
vidual members of Congress, congressional party leaders, the Presi-
dent, and high-level administrative officials. Particularly in the context
of larger pieces of legislation, more powerful players may be able to
slip in offsets to pay for their pet programs, catching the target group
off-guard.
226 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 6, at 515-21.
227 Id. at 515.
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Even before PAYGO, Congress agreed in its 1986 tax reform de-
bate that it would enact revenue and distributionally-neutral legisla-
tion. This new approach to tax legislation altered the tax-writing pro-
cess:
Prior revenue bills were often constructed through political
logrolling, whereby special interest provisions were added,
one to the next, until a winning coalition was achieved. As
intended, revenue neutrality converted this process into a
"zero-sum game": each interest was in competition with all
others, because "spending" limited tax expenditure revenues
to benefit one interest precluded using them to aid another.
The fierce competition for available revenues in the tax-
reform debate jeopardized any interest that lacked an ag-
gressive inside spokesman for its cause. 228
PAYGO, adopted as part of the 1990 Budget Act, simply codified the
revenue neutrality principle that Congress informally began in 1986.
All of the players in the PAYGO process are on the hunt for tar-
gets that can be used for revenue offset purposes; none of the players
is exempt. Testimony from the executive branch and lobbyists rou-
tinely refers to the need to look for offsets. For example, in the year of
the installment sale story, the Assistant Treasury Department Secre-
tary for Tax Policy began his testimony on the budget by noting, "I
believe it is helpful to understand the framework of the President's FY
2000 budget and the need for revenue offsets." 228
 Virtually every
group testifying for favored spending programs or tax breaks refers to
the need for finding an appropriate offset. 2" Increased PAYGO costs
are borne not only by those advocating new tax benefits for them-
selves, but also by beneficiaries of existing tax legislation who must
fight to keep their programs off the target lists to be used for revenue
offsets. This whole process raises questions about the durability of tax
legislation in general. Having succeeded in fighting a particular provi-
229 TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, ET AL., TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM 101
(1990).
229 Lubick testimony, supra note 129.
2" For example, an official testifying in favor of a continued payment of monthly edu-
cational assistance benefits to veterans commented that as to costs subject to PAYGO, "we
would need to work with you to identify necessary offsets for proposals we were to sup-
port." Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Benefits, House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Celia P. Dollarhide, Director, Education Service, Veterans' Benefits
Administration, Dep't of Veterans' Affairs).
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sion through the process, one can never be sure that it won't be tar-
geted as an offset later on.
Despite the gimmicks, most commentators agree that the mod-
ern legislative budget process generally has provided valuable re-
straints and has successfully imposed an element of self-discipline on a
Congress that might otherwise be inclined to continue spending the
country deep into deficits."' After all, it's always politically easier to
spend more money for constituents than to restrict spending or take
benefits away. In order for the process to provide stability and to re-
tain credibility, it is important that deals struck by the participants in
the process be maintained. Most budget observers seem to believe
that the advantages outweigh the costs. In general, the advantage is
thought to be at least some modicum of fiscal constraint." 2
 Others
have found more subtle advantages. For example, Professor Garrett
argues that the increased interest group conflict generated by PAYGO
may be useful to Congress in providing more information about pro-
grams that Congress would otherwise not be able to scrutinize ade-
quately.233 She also argues that this information might be helpful in
providing a more systematic review of tax expenditures, which are
frequently targets for revenue offsets. 234
2. Bypassing PAYGO
Despite the apparent costs of PAYGO, it appears that Congress
can easily buy its way out of the fiscal constraints as it did so brazenly
with the retroactive repeal of the installment sale provision. Surely,
there can be no fiscal constraint if a revenue neutral deal is arranged
for one budget year and then undone in the following year by a stand-
alone measure, which repeals one of the necessary revenue offsets
231 see, e.g., Setticx, supra note 1, at 69 ("PAYGO contributed to the liquidation of
budget deficits by hampering enactment of new direct spending legislation and making it
easier for the government to hold onto its revenue dividend."); Pollack, supra note 69, at
1050 ("PAYGO checks the natural instincts of Democrats to over-spend and Republicans to
slash taxes for their constituents. The result has been a dose of fiscal constraint for the
budget process; budget surpluses, and consequently, paying down sonic portion of the
national debt, are now a real possibility.").
232 One early observation was that "ltl he PAYGO process seems to have discouraged
major efforts to increase entitlement spending or cut taxes or both." Joyce & Rcischauer,
supra note 44, at 438. Richard May observed that "PAYGO has provided some sense of fiscal
discipline and has worked ninety to ninety-five percent of the time." Telephone interview
with Richard May Staff Director of the House Budget Comm., 1993-1997 (Mar. 26, 2002)
(notes on file with the author).
233 Garrett, supra note 6, at 556-60.
rm Id. at 564-69.
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from the prior year. Congress has found numerous ways to avoid the
sting of PAYGO rules. For example, it can bypass PAYGO enforcement
mechanisms entirely by classifying legislation as "emergency" legisla-
tion, effectively removing it from the PAYGO scorecard. 255 More
significantly, Congress increasingly has used directed scorekeeping to
avoid PAYGO constraints. In fact, in each fiscal year since 2000, Con-
gress has bypassed PAYGO simply by directing OMB to set yearly
amounts subject to PAYGO sequester to zero. 236
My contention in this Article is that when Congress uses tech-
niques such as those used in the installment method case study or
those being used more generally to bypass PAYGO requirements, it is
breaching a contract or precommitment made with the public. 237 The
budget is a complex deal presumably negotiated on behalf of and in
the interests of the country's citizens. The citizens have a right to ex-
pect that the deal be enforced.
3. The "Statute as Contract"
Beginning in about the 1980s, political scientists began to ex-
plore the idea that legislatures were really markets for wealth transfers
and that politicians were simply brokers selling legislative goods. 299
The theory developed into a more sophisticated body of scholarship
in the economic and political science literature known as "public
choice."239 Although it is not the dominant mode of statutory inter-
pretation, many impressive legal scholars borrowed from the econom-
ics model, using contract-like principles to interpret statutes. Perhaps
2" 2 U.S.C. § 902(d), (e) (2000).
Dep't of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from
and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, div. C, § 102,
2001 U.S.C.CA.N. (115 Stat.) 2330,2342 (setting PAYGO sequester to zero for 2001 and
2002); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 2(b), 2000
U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat.) 2763 (setting PAYGO sequester to zero for 2001); Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, div. B, § 1001(c), 113 Stat. 1501,1537 (set-
ting PAYGO sequester to zero for FY2000).
237
 For a discussion of the notion of government precommitment and its analogy to
government contracts in the tax setting, see Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic
Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government ("recommitment, 94 Micit. L. REV. 1 129 (1996).
2" Among the first, basic approaches along these lines was ROBERT E. McColuvitcx &
ROBERT D. TOWSON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT (1981); see also MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBY-
ISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS (1981).
2" Perhaps the best definition of "public choice" is simply the "economic study of
nonmarket decision making." DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 1 (1989). In the
legislative context, quite simply, public choice is the application of economic principles to
the legislative process.
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the most well-known is Judge Easterbrook, who argued that certain
statutes represent bargains among special interests and should be in-
terpreted under a "statute as contract" mode1. 240
Major budget reconciliation and omnibus legislation packages
involve complex negotiations with lobbyists and members of Con-
gress, between members within each of the chambers of Congress,
between members of the two chambers of Congress, between Con-
gress and the President, between Congress and executive agencies,
and more. If any statute can be described as a "contract" or "deal," the
budget reconciliation package surely must be it. Moreover, the deal
must be among the most complex statutory deals that Congress
makes.
Virtually all of the literature that has considered the "statute as
contract" or "statute as deal" analogy has been in the context of statu-
tory interpretation. In each case, scholars have been concerned with
the appropriate methodology to be used in interpreting the meaning
of the text. My concern here is not with statutory interpretation or the
meaning of text. In fact, the text of the Installment Tax Correction
Act of 2000 is extraordinarily straightforward, brief, and unambigu-
ous."' Even the text of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Im-
provement Act that was retroactively repealed by the Installment Tax
Correction Act is not especially complicated. 242 The question I wish to
raise in the context of legislative deals is somewhat unusual: can a
statutory contract effectively be breached and, if so, what is the
significance of such a breach?
In his important article on legislative deals, Professor Dan Farber
noted that he was deliberately not addressing the "aspect of contract
24° Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARI/. L. REV. 4, 18
(1984); Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests, 75 MINN. L. REV. 667
(1991). An extensive article advocating the strong analogy between legislation and con-
tracts and specifying positive canons of statutory construction based upon the contract
analogy is McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 80 GEO. Lj. 705 (1992) (the author "McNollgast" is actually short for Matthew
McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast). But see Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really
'Legislative Bargains'? The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1145 (1998). For application of the "statute as contract" model particularly in the tax
context, see Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and De-
creasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987). But see Shayiro, supra note 29,
at 63-80 (critiquing the statute-as-contract model).
241 The statutory language is quoted at supra note 152 and accompanying text.
242 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170,
§ 536, 113 Stat. 1860, 1936.
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law involving the dynamics of renegotiation."243 He went on to ob-
serve:
The possibility of strategic breach or threats to breach is an
important factor in contract law. Although statutes may in
some sense be "deals," they do not share this feature. Legis-
lators cannot breach a statute in the way that businesses
breach a contract. Legislators can, of course, breach various
side-agreements, such as logrolling deals. But they don't
have the option of violating a statute and risking a damage
payment to other legislators. Because they can't threaten to
unilaterally halt performance of the statute, the dynamics of
renegotiation are also quite different.... I will simply as-
sume, rather arbitrarily, that the parties will not seek to bet-
ter their situation through opportunistic conduct during tbe
performance of the contract. 244
I disagree with Professor Farber's suggestion that contract anal-
ogy doesn't hold up when it comes to the potential for strategic
breach or threats to breach a contract. In fact, I believe that this is
precisely what transpired in the installment sale retroactive repeal
story. Congress as a whole reached a deal on a reconciliation bill.
That deal involved using a repeal of installment sale reporting for ac-
crual method taxpayers as a revenue offset to pay for tax breaks de-
sired by Republicans. Party leaders and special interest groups then
engaged in an opportunistic side deal by which they agreed to repeal
the repeal that had just been used for revenue offset purposes. I con-
sider this analogous to a breach of contract. 245
One obvious objection to the contract analogy is that Congress
did not formally violate any rules. Congressional instructions direct-
ing OMB effectively to ignore the PAYGO rules were done through
proper constitutional enactment of a statute followed by presentment
243
 Farber, supra note 240, at 678.
244 Id.
245 I would not be the first to analogize a statute to breach of contract in the legislative
setting. In a different context, Professor Logue has argued that repeal of a tax subsidy is
analogous to a breach of contract for which the affected taxpayer is entitled to relief. He
argues that taxpayers who engage in certain investment behavior relying upon, for exam-
ple, a tax deduction designed as an incentive to engage in that activity have something
akin to a contractual right to that deduction. See Logue, supra note 237, at 1143-49. To be
sure, I am extending Professor Logue's analogy well beyond the case of reliance interests
of particular taxpayers. At the same time, unlike Professor Logue, I am not arguing for any
particularized relief to taxpayers.
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of the statute to the President for signature. If there was a contract at
all, one might simply say that Congress revoked the old contract and
substituted a new one.246 Surely, it cannot be that a breach of contract
arises whenever a successor statute changes a former statute. Moreo-
ver, it is a well-settled principle of constitutional law that one Congress
cannot bind another. Any subsequent Congress is free to alter the law
enacted by an earlier Congress.
My argument, of course, differs from the classical contract argu-
ment. The very reason that Congress imposed upon itself the fiscal
disciplines beginning with the 1990 Budget Act was its understanding
that members would too easily succumb to natural inclinations to
want it all. Like the public at large, lawmakers would like to keep
spending under control, manage the deficit, and assure themselves
that they will not squander a surplus. At the same time, they know that
human nature makes it easy to agree to these lofty principles, yet to
go on spending in violation of these principles when specific pro-
grams seem attractive or when they are pressured by constituents.
Thus, they agreed to bind themselves to a contract—a contract of self-
discipline.
If I go to a weight loss center and sign a "contract" with the cen-
ter, and with myself, to maintain a certain regimen, have I broken the
contract if I fail to comply with the regimen? Technically speaking, I
could say that I did nothing of the sort. Because I made the agree-
ment and paid with my own funds, there is no reason that I couldn't
later decide to make a different agreement. Similarly, because Con-
gress wrote the contract to bind itself in the first place, why can't it
agree to a different contract? For one thing, the situations are very
different. My diet contract is a personal one with the diet center. I cer-
tainly don't purport to represent anyone else. Congress, on the other
hand, represents the public. Although it has made a contract with it-
self, the contract reflects commitments which the public expects to be
maintained.
In any event, even when I fail to comply with my own weight loss
regimen, I think of myself as breaking the contract or even as "cheat-
2  In any event, even in cases where COngress has formally violated its own rules,
courts have been reluctant to intervene, generally upholding congressional action against
challenges to the legitimacy of statutes enacted in violation of statutory or internal House
or Senate rules. See, e.g., Metzenbaum v. Fed. Energy Regulatory COMM, 675 F.2d 1282
(D.C. Cir. 1982). For a good general discussion of the issues, see Michael B. Miller, The
Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the Political' Political Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1341 (1990).
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ing." One can cheat on different levels. I can cheat by hiding in a dark
closet with my ice cream or by eating it openly with abandon, admit-
ting to the world that I am breaking the rules. Similarly, when Con-
gress engages in behavior as it did in the retroactive repeal of the in-
stallment sale repeal, I think of Congress as "cheating" or breaching
its contract with itself. Rather than cheating openly, however, Con-
gress was hiding in the closet with its ice cream. When I hide my viola-
tion, I arguably hurt no one but myself. Congress, on the other hand,
does far more damage by using gimmicks to break its self-imposed
rules.
The contract here is really a political contract with the voters.
The issues are the democratically-oriented issues of political account-
ability, transparency, durability, openness, and durability. If Congress
consistently violates the same fiscal constraint rules in the budget proc-
ess, one might argue that such acts constitute some type of implied
repeal or contract revocation. In the budget world, however, the viola-
tions have been somewhat random. Such random changes leave vot-
ers so confused that it would be difficult to penalize legislators at the
polls. The recent yearly congressional directions to OMB to set the
PAYGO scorecard to zero repealed PAYGO for the years in question
without repealing PAYGO outright. Was Congress repealing PAYGO or
not? Transparency and openness principles demand fulfillment of the
public's right to be better informed. In addition, durability and con-
sistency concerns require more than a year-to-year, ad-hoc response to
enforcement of budget process rules. The public has a right to expect
that the budget process set forth in the statutory budget process rules
generally will be observed. Once an omnibus budget deal is worked
out, the public should expect that the deal will be kept. Finally, the
deal that is negotiated should be negotiated openly, giving the public
a fair chance to assess whether the deal has been kept or not.
F. Budget Reforms to Continue Fiscal Constraints and Respond to
Pathologies of the Current Process
1. PAYGO Reforms
a. PAYGO in Times of Surplus
Perhaps the installment sale episode simply reflects Congress's
apathetic attitude towards fiscal constraints in a period of budget sur-
plus. As budget surpluses began to appear in the mid-to-late 1990s,
Congress became less concerned with the strictures of budget rules.
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As former CBO Director Robert Reischauer recently observed, the
effectiveness of PAYGO deteriorated after 1998: "Congress flouted the
restraints of the Budget Enforcement Act." 247 Although some mem-
bers of Congress seem to believe that PAYGO fiscal constraints are less
important, or perhaps even unnecessary, in times of surplus, this is far
from the uniform view. Prior to the recent and dramatic turn-around
from surplus to deficit, the Deputy Director of the CBO testified that
PAYGO offset rules "could continue to be an important component of
budget discipline. Even in a period of surpluses, maintaining an effec-
tive framework of budget discipline is an important hedge against un-
certain budget projections and political pressure to increase spend-
ing."248 Even Republican members of Congress have testified in favor
of maintaining PAYGO, in periods of budget surplus as well as
deficit. 249 Assuming that PAYGO fiscal discipline works, it seems short-
sighted to use it only in deficit years and to abandon it completely in
surplus years.
Most lawmakers and budget observers still believe that the fiscal
constraints imposed by the Budget Act of 1990, with all their faults
and limitations, have done some good and should be extended in
some fashion. Because the primary concern driving the initial con-
straints was huge budget deficits, one may question the need for ma-
jor constraints in periods of budget surplus. Surely fiscal constraints
should not be abandoned simply because Congress happens to be op-
erating in a moment of budget surplus. Budget projections are noto-
riously uncertain and become increasingly so the further out in time
such projections extend. Moreover, recent events in the United States
show how quickly and dramatically economic circumstances can
change from surplus to deficit. In any event, even in times of surplus,
Congress has an obligation to future Congresses and to future genera-
tions to leave the surplus available to cover unforeseen costs, such as
those of social security and the like.
That said, it may make sense to have a different set of disciplinary
rules that apply in times of surplus. Through its actions, Congress has
247 Framing the Budget Debate for the Future: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Budget,
107th Cong. (Jan. 24, 2002) (statement of Robert D. Reischauer, Urban Institute). Richard
May, former Staff Director of the House Budget Committee and observer of the budget
process, also reports that Congress violated PAYGO rules much more frequently in times of
surplus than in times of deficit. Telephone interview with Richard May, supra note 232.
"8 Federal Budget Process Structure Hearing, supra note 109.
249 Id. (statement of Rep. Bill Frenzel) ("PAYGO discipline should be maintained. ...
Legislation that would commit surpluses in excess of the amounts contained in the budget
should be subject to PAYGO rules and, if enacted, trigger sequestration.").
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clearly shown that it will behave differently during surplus periods
than it will during deficit periods. Far better, it seems to me, to have
the rules of engagement spelled out in advance than to have all the
gimmicks and hidden loopholes that Congress now uses to get around
the technical PAYGO rules in surplus years when it's feeling more free
to ignore them. As it is, budget rules are complex enough to explain
to the public, and even to many members of Congress who work with
them, without the hidden gimmicks of fancy accounting and "di-
rected scorekeeping." It would be better simply to have a different,
perhaps more relaxed, set of rules on the budget books for surplus
years in the first place.
There have been earlier proposals for changes in the PAYGO
rules in an era of surplus. For example, the failed Comprehensive
Budget Process Reform Act of 1999 250 would have permitted tax cuts
without offsets as long as the government was running on an on-
budget surplus. Then-CBO Director Dan Crippen testified that
such a change would make it possible to enact legislation in-
creasing mandatory spending or cutting taxes without offsets
up to the amount of a projected on-budget surplus for the
year. That change would add some flexibility to the PAYGO
rules without jettisoning the overall budgetary discipline that
they now impose, since legislation causing an on-budget
deficit would still have to be offset. 251
To my mind, this is far too much flexibility. If the idea is to im-
pose any serious fiscal constraint, Congress should limit its ability to
cut taxes or increase mandatory spending more significantly than by
simply promising not to use up the surplus. A more promising reform
would be something like that advocated by former CBO Director
Robert Reischauer, who proposed a "budget process reform which
would allow each new Congress to encumber only a declining fraction
of the resources that exceed the fiscal goal under the baseline projec-
tion."252 The system would be enforced through some variation of the
current PAYGO system.
Whatever the mechanism, Congress should think in advance
through a sort of "partial veil of ignorance," a differential set of rules
25° H.R. 853, 106th Cong. (1999).
251 Improving Efficiency of the Budget Process, Hearings on H.R. 853: Hearing Before the House
Budget Comm., 106th Cong. (May 20, 1999) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Dir., CBO).
252
 Federal Budget Process Hearings, supra note 103 (statement of Robert D. Reischauer,
Pres., Urban Institute).
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as to how it wishes to exercise fiscal discipline in times of deficit as
well as surplus. 253 Given that it has recently had a taste of surplus, but
has returned to deficits, now would be an ideal time for Congress to
design a revised set of PAYGO-like rules with some flexibility, similar to
those suggested by Reischauer, in which part, but not all, of a pro-
jected surplus could be used for tax cuts and increased spending
without offsets.
b. Other PAYGO Reforms
Another concern with existing PAYGO rules is that they look only
at growth in mandatory or entitlement spending from new legislation,
but leave "completely unconstrained any growth in these programs
that results from economic or demographic factors." 254 One possible
solution would be to add some kind of "lookback" rule to the current
PAYGO enforcement scheme that would take such growth into ac-
count.255 This type of reform would, of course, strengthen PAYGO en-
forcement.
From a very different perspective others have suggested reforms
to weaken PAYGO enforcement. A recently commissioned report by
the Republican Chair of the Joint Economic Committee complains
that PAYGO rules have a perverse effect on tax and expenditure pol-
icy. 266 The report contends that PAYGO rules are biased against tax
cuts and new spending that would encourage savings and invest-
ment. 257 Included among the reform proposals in the report is a
switch to dynamic scoring that would take into account how changes
in tax policy will affect the overall economy. 258 Such scoring is difficult
and often unreliable, but does often lead to more optimistic forecasts.
Thus, it would more often permit tax cuts without imposing large
PAYGO offsets.
Another proposal would be to exempt from PAYGO any tax legis-
lation that would merely defer the collection of tax rather than exempt
the collection of tax altogether. 259 Interestingly, under this approach,
253 For the suggestion of applying a "veil of ignorance" type approach in budgeting
matters, see Can Ignorance Be Bliss?, supra note 207, at 971-72.
254 1996 GAO BUDGET PROCESS REPORT, supra note 173, at 14.
"5 Id. at 13-14.
256 JOINT ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., EXTENDING THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT:
REVISION OF PAYGO RULES NECESSARY FOR BETTER TAX POLICY 2 (2002).
157 Id. at 4,14.
"8 Id. at 11-13.
"9 Id. at 13.
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the installment sale provision that is the subject of this Article would
not have been subject to PAYGO rules at all. The issue in tax collec-
tion for an installment sale is whether the government collects the
entire tax due at the time of the sale or, instead, collects the tax over
the period of installment payments. Installment reporting simply de-
fers collection of the tax, but does not exempt it altogether. The gov-
ernment and taxpayers alike know the tremendous advantage of
"float," or the time value of money. In fact, a significant number of
the tax policy debates in Congress are not about whether to tax, but
about when to tax. To my mind, exempting from PAYGO any tax legis-
lation that defers the collection of tax would take almost all the bite
out of an already toothless enforcement provision, and would not be a
wise reform.
2. Abandon Directed Storekeeping
Although the installment sale story is striking and unusual, the
use of directed scorekeeping is far more common than one would
ever expect. Oddly enough, although the term is widely used in
budget circles in Congress, it does not appear in the index to any of
the major books on the budget process. 260 The term can be used in
two different contexts. First, although Congress generally uses the
economic assumptions and projections provided by the CBO, it some-
times directs the CBO to use alternate figures provided by the execu-
tive branch OMB when the latter's figures are more favorable to con-
gressional purposes. Schick's treatise on the budget does briefly refer
in the text to this practice of "directed scoring. "261 Although this type
of direct scoring is troublesome, the direct scorekeeping I refer to
here is far more flagrant and almost never addressed in the literature.
This second type of directed scorekeeping is simply the use of a
huge congressional eraser. To keep the two distinct, I'll refer to the
first type as "directed scoring" and the second as "directed scorekeep-
ing." Directed scorekeeping seems almost common practice with re-
gard to spending and appropriations and is becoming more common
in the PAYGO setting as well. To use one example, when CBO Direc-
tor Dan Crippen was asked by ranking Democrats on the House
26° See, e.g., COLLENDER, supra note 54, at 202, 214; Scincx, supra note 45, at 597;
SCHICK, SUM note 1, at 302; WILDAVSKY & CAIDEN, supra note 3.
261 SCHICK, supra note 1, at 63 ("In some cases, Congress picks and chooses between
OMB and C80 assumptions, taking from each those that score its appropriations as less
costly.").
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Budget Committee to compute the on-budget surplus for fiscal year
2000, he replied rather routinely that "we include the effects of vari-
ous scorekeeping directives and adjustments made by the budget
committees, which would have the effect of reducing the outlays at-
tributed to appropriations bills. . . . In total, these adjustments come
to about $17 billion for the House and $16 billion for the Senate." 262
Rather dramatically, for each fiscal year since 2000, Congress has
directed the OMB in preparing its final PAYGO sequestration report
to change any balance of direct spending and receipts legislation to
zero.265 It seems that Congress has a big magic number eraser that it
feels increasingly comfortable using when other gimmicks fail in the
budget process. This approach to budgeting is simply irresponsible. 264
If the budget process is to have any meaning and the hard work of all
the participants is to be given any respect, the use of the magic eraser
must be curtailed.
Congress has previously attempted without success to restrict it-
self with regard to directed scorekeeping. For example, its concurrent
budget resolution for fiscal year 2001 included an explicit provision
making it out of order in the House to consider "any reported bill or
joint resolution, or amendment thereto or conference report
thereon, that contains a directed scorekeeping provision."265 Despite
this provision in the budget resolution, Congress continues to use di-
rected scorekeeping.
Congress must get more serious about abandoning directed
scorekeeping. Thus far, provisions incorporated into the annual con-
current budget resolution have not been effective. Since the budget
resolution is not presented to the President for signature, it does not
carry the force of law. I suggest that Congress amend the statutory
budget rules by adding a provision that prohibits the use of directed
scorekeeping. Although Congress has been known to break its own
statutory budget laws, statutory budget laws do carry the force of law
262 Letter from Congressional Budget Office Director Dan L. Crippen, to Hon. John
M. Spratt, Jr., Ranking Dem. Member, House Budget Comm. (Aug. 26, 1999), reprinted in
Tax NOTES TODAY (Sept. 14, 1999).
262 See supra note 236.
264 As long ago as 1991, OMB Director Richard Darman complained that bills contain-
ing directed scorekeeping provisions violate the Budget Enforcement Act, which desig-
nates "OMB as the 'scorekeeper' of the budget effect of legislation for purposes of calcu-
lating whether a spending limit has been exceeded or the pay-as-you-go requirement has
been violated." Mid-Session Review of the Budget: Hearing Before the House Comm on the Budget,
102d Cong. (1991) (introductory statement of Richard G. Darman, Director, OMB).
262 H.R. Con. Res. 290, 106th Cong. § 203 (2000) (enacted).
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and have been more effective fiscal restraint devices than internal
procedural rules.
3. Information Failures
Whether the explanation of events is honest mistake or the art of
the deal, one message that comes through clearly from the install-
ment sale story is the extent to which the budget-making process is
complex and hidden from view. To some extent, particular provisions
get obscured by the sheer complexity of the process. Simplicity is of-
ten near or at the top of the list on the tax reform agenda, yet appears
hardly at all in budget reform discussion. To be sure, there is at least
one good explanation for this difference. Taxpayers have regular con-
tact with the tax system and are expected to comply with it by filing
regular tax returns. Every taxpaying citizen must be able to under-
stand the system sufficiently well to comply with these obligations.
Moreover, our tax system depends heavily on voluntary compliance.
The greater the level of simplicity, the higher the levels of compli-
ance.
In contrast, the ordinary citizen can get by perfectly well knowing
little or nothing about the budget process. In that sense, perhaps,
simplicity is less critical. At the same time, however, the budget rules
have become so complex that even many members of Congress don't
understand them. Although most individual citizens may not be in-
terested in watching the budget process, the process ought to be acces-
sible to the small number of citizens who are interested and the
watch-dog groups that follow the budget on behalf of a larger society
that does not pay close attention.
One striking detail of the repeal of the installment sale reporting
story is the eery silence of the small business interest lobby through-
out the two separate rounds of budget bills that ultimately led to the
Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Act of 1999. 266 Even though the
provision was included in both the House and Senate versions of the
first bill that was ultimately vetoed by President Clinton and was in the
Senate version of the second bill, the lobby claimed to know nothing
about the provision until the President signed the second bill. It was
only at that point that they became extremely busy. One wonders
where they were throughout the budget process. Lobbyists are paid—
often extraordinary salaries—for pouring over voluminous legislation
266 Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 536, 113 Stat. 1860, 1936.
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on the lookout for provisions that impact their clients. Could they
have missed this one? Were they simply asleep at the wheel?
One interesting issue here is the extent to which Congress has
some obligation to highlight particular provisions that should be of
interest to certain groups or even alert particular interest groups that
remain silent at moments when their silence seems surprising. Con-
gressman Archer, for example, expressed surprise that the small busi-
ness interest groups were so quiet with regard to the installment sale
provision.267 Some might object that this is what lobbyists are paid to
do and that Congress should not be doing the work for them. On the
other hand, there are many small interests that are not represented by
high-powered lobbyists who could benefit from at least being alerted
to the existence of provisions that might impact them that are buried
in large omnibus or reconciliation packages.
Surprisingly enough, it is not only the interest groups that suffer
from lack of information, but also many members of Congress them-
selves. Rank-and-file members of Congress also claimed to be com-
pletely unaware of the installment sale repeal provision and its impact
until after the second round of legislation and after the President
signed the bill. Although members receive reports about large bills,
the reports are long and the details of provisions such as the install-
ment sale repeal tend to get buried and lost. Particularly with regard
to reconciliation and omnibus legislation, it seems that individual
members of Congress need to have the information provided to them
in a different format.
Rather than simply present provisions in a long reconciliation bill
and accompanying report on an item-by-item basis with a paragraph
explanation for each provision, the report should break provisions
down by subject matter and by potentially impacted parties. Even pro-
viding a detailed index would be useful. Congress should also create a
public information office specifically designed to answer questions
from the public and reporters interested in detailed information on
tax legislation and the budget.
4. The Formal and Informal Summit
Another concern is the extent to which individual members of
Congress are completely left out of last-minute budget negotiations.
Budget and tax legislation is increasingly decided by formal summits
467 Telephone interview with Bill Archer, supra note 133.
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among party leaders and White House and Treasury Department ne-
gotiators. The installment sale story involved a more informal process
conducted at the last minute by telephone between party leaders and
Treasury Department officials. Much to the surprise of many in the
House, where the installment sale repeal for accrual method taxpay-
ers had been left out of the legislation, Bill Archer agreed to a last-
minute deal with Treasury Department Secretary Lawrence Summers
to put the provision back in the bill. 268 Many House members did not
even realize that they were voting for legislation that included the in-
stallment sale provision.
Some regularization of the formal and informal "summit" proc-
ess is clearly necessary. One hesitates even to use the term "reform"
here, given that the summit process has developed in an ad hoc fash-
ion and there essentially are no rules. The time has come to develop
them. At a minimum, these sessions should not be closed to public
view and should not be limited to a handful of select party leaders.
Perhaps some mandatory waiting period should be built in so that the
details of a deal can be processed rather than worked out over the
telephone in a five-minute conversation and then quickly incorpo-
rated into a massive piece of legislation. If nothing else, stand-alone
repeals of individual pieces of a larger legislative package are legisla-
tively inefficient.
5. Tax Policy Reforms
As the need to meet deadlines for budgets and appropriations as
well as the inevitability of dealmaking have taken over, discussions of
tax policy have become almost nonexistent in the budget process.
Many pieces of tax legislation are included in omnibus budget legisla-
tion without any hearings at all ( on the tax issues. As a matter of
budget reform, separate tax hearings should be held with regard to
any tax legislation incorporated in the budget. In addition, a "Tax Pol-
icy Compliance Report" should be published by the appropriate
committee. The report should include an assessment of the relevant
tax policy norms balanced against any competing budget policy objec-
tives. This report should be made available to members of Congress
and to the public before any votes are taken on budget legislation.
268 Id.
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CONCLUSION
In the end, the success of PAYGO as an enforcement mechanism
is only as good as the congressional will to abide by it. Reforms may be
enacted, but pathologies will continue until the public decides to hold
congressional feet to the fire. At the end of the day, no amount of
fiscal constraint can keep Congress from breaching its contracts with
itself. For example, as Professor Kate Stith observed with respect to
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings:
[A]lthough these new procedures have been enacted by
statute, passed by each House and signed by the President,
either House may, pursuant to its own rules, modify them in
the future. Because GRH's budget process requirements are
only internal rule changes, they cannot constitutionally bind
future congresses. They are binding only so long as each
House chooses to uphold them as a matter of institutional
integrity and political will. 269
That said, there still are some reforms that could prevent, or at
least minimize, the likelihood of blatant end-runs around the fiscal
disciplines imposed by budget. For one thing, there should be disclo-
sure rules which assure that revenue offsets being used as part of a bill
are sufficiently highlighted that they receive the appropriate attention
from interested parties. As noted above, this might take the form of
required notice to affected interest groups during the legislative pro-
cess, invitations to such groups to appear at legislative hearings and
the like. The main purpose here would be to devise rules that would
prevent surprise backroom deals that catch interested groups, as well
as rank-and-file members of Congress, unaware.
Most importantly, it should not be permissible for Congress to
avoid the revenue offset procedures required by PAYGO through
stand-alone measures in subsequent years. Budget rules should be al-
tered to clarify that all revenue-raising and offsetting provisions must
occur in the same year and independent pieces of the package should
not be altered in subsequent years unless the entire package is up for
review. To be sure, virtually all of the budget process rules can be
waived. In the Senate, however, most rules require a three-fifths vote.
Although some question the cumbersome nature of these superma-
jority rules, if they are to be applied, they should be applied consis-
269 Stith, supra note 88, at 667 (footnotes omitted).
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tendy. Budget process rules should be designed to prevent easy end-
runs around point-of-order rules in the Senate so as to avoid the su-
permajority voting requirements.
To be sure, reading on the proposed repeal of installment
method reporting for accrual method taxpayers was not on the New
York Times bestseller lists. In fact, the provision did not even garner
much attention in the financial press. The impact was felt only by an
intense small business lobby. From a research point of view, simply
tracking down the legislative events that transpired was the closest
thing to investigative reporting that I have ever done. Many of the
relevant documents were obscure and hard to find. Some details I was
able to uncover only by making phone calls to knowledgeable staff at
the Ways and Means and Joint Tax Committees and to Congressman
Archer himself. This, in itself, speaks volumes. Given how bizarre the
events were, I suppose the major participants did not want the docu-
ments to be easily found and the gimmicks to be exposed.
When the dust settles, the important message here is not the par-
ticular story of installment sale reporting and accrual method taxpay-
ers. The much larger concern is the pathologies reflected in the viola-
tions of the democratic budget principles of enforceability,
accountability, transparency, openness, and durability. At the same
time, important tax policy objectives are lost in the process. My hope
is that as Congress considers extending the fiscal constraints of the
1990 Budget Act, it will demonstrate respect for democracy-oriented
principles along with a sincere dual concern for fiscal discipline and
tax equity.
